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Medicare guarantees health insurance coverage for any person 65 or older. 
However, Medicare coverage is not complete and the additional costs are 
substantial: for example, the hospital deductible for part A is $956 and the part B 
deductible amounts to $123 in 2006. The elderly can insure against these financial 
risks by obtaining supplemental insurance from different sources. A private market 
designed to cover the “gaps” in Medicare is known as the “Medigap” market. This 
market is regulated since 1992 by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. 
The law created markets with homogenous goods mainly by standardizing the 
policies that could be offered. Economic theory predicts that in a market for 
homogenous goods, there should be little or no price variation. However, 
premiums of Medigap policies continue to vary even within narrowly defined 
markets. 
This dissertation is concerned with finding economic explanations for this puzzle. 
Sources of premium variation in the Medigap market are empirically investigated as 
well as reasons for why premium variation is sustained. Chapter one provides a 
general overview of the Medigap market and points out specific peculiarities due to 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. In the second chapter, which is joint 
work with Nicole Maestas and Dana Goldman, differences in the populations covered 
by insurance firms are investigated with respect to their impact on actuarially fair  
premiums. The third chapter focuses on how firms set prices for specific components 
of Medigap premiums and how these change over time. Also, the degree to which firm 
and state specific variables explain premium variation is investigated. The fourth 
chapter (joint with Nicole Maestas and Dana Goldman) targets the consumer side of 
the Medigap market by estimating a structural model that allows for sustained price 
variation due to consumer search costs. 
The findings in this dissertation suggest that premium variation is at least partially 
caused by firm specific differences The premium variation is sustained through 
consumer search costs and thus uninformed consumers. However, there are some 
indications that the market experienced an increase in competition that reduces 
premium variation. 
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1.CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND TO THE MEDIGAP MARKET 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the background about the private market for health insurance 
supplemental to Medicare, the Medigap market. It is designed to avoid 
redundancies in the successive chapters. Section 1.2. will give an overview of the 
history of the market. Section 1.3. provides a detailed investigation of a specific 
event, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, and how it affected the Medigap 
market. In section 1.4. previous literature about the Medigap Market will be 
discussed. Section 1.5. is essential to this dissertation, as it introduces the main 
dataset used in the analysis, the Medigap premium data by Weiss Ratings, Inc. It 
will not only provide important information about the contents of the dataset but 
describe the data construction as well. Section 1.6. briefly summarizes the findings 
of this chapter. 
 
1.2.  Private Supplemental Insurance To Medicare 
Health insurance coverage is crucial for the elderly. With increasing age, the need 
to insure against the financial burden of everyday illnesses as well as against 
catastrophic losses due to health shocks becomes more and more important. 
Medicare, enacted in 1965, guarantees health insurance coverage for any person 65 
and older and for certain disabled individuals. Medicare coverage has two 
components: Part A, termed “hospital insurance” for inpatient and some nursing 
home care, and Part B, “medical insurance” for doctor’s services and outpatient 
procedures. As long as certain work requirements are fulfilled, Part A does not  
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involve a premium and starts automatically at age 65. Part B requires a monthly 
premium of $88 in 2006 and active enrollment.  
Medicare coverage is not complete and the additional costs are substantial: for 
example, the hospital deductible for part A is $956, any hospital stays beyond the 60
th 
day require a coinsurance of $236 per day, and the part B deductible amounts to $123 
(all in 2006). The elderly can insure against these considerable financial risks by 
obtaining supplemental insurance from four different sources: former employers, 
Medicaid, Medicare Managed Care (also called Medicare HMOs), and a private 
market designed to cover the “gaps” in Medicare known as the “Medigap” market.  
While the employer provided insurance requires the individual to have an 
employer providing retirement coverage and Medicaid is restricted to individuals 
below a certain income threshold, Medicare Managed Care and the Medigap market 
are open to all elderly. About 30 percent of Medicare beneficiaries obtain 
supplemental insurance through the private Medigap market, another 30 percent obtain 
supplemental coverage through their former employer, about 15 percent eliminate the 
coverage gaps by enrolling in Medicare managed care, and 15 percent are eligible for 
and receive supplemental coverage through the Medicaid program. The remaining 10 
percent relied on Medicare exclusively for their medical costs (MedPac, 2003). As the 
Medicare managed care market has contracted since its peak 1998 and employers 
continue to reduce coverage for new retirees (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005), the 
Medigap market may become an even more important source of supplemental 
insurance in the future. 
Since its inception, the Medigap market has attracted the concern of 
policymakers. Allegations of insurer fraud and concerns that the elderly were both 
uniformed about their coverage needs and unable to navigate the complexities of 
supplemental coverage offers led states to adopt minimum benefits standards in the  
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late 70s and early 80s (Finkelstein, 2004). Nevertheless, concerns about insurer 
malpractice grew, as consumer protection agencies accused insurers of extracting large 
rents by intentionally misleading people into purchasing multiple plans with duplicate 
coverage (Select Committee on Aging, 1990). This led to drastic reform of the 
Medigap market with the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 
in 1990. OBRA-90 imposed several regulations on the Medigap market, both to the 
company and the consumer side, to reduce consumer confusion and to increase 
consumer welfare. These regulations are discussed in detail in the next section.  
 
1.3.  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act Of 1990 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990 federally introduced 
several regulations intended to strengthen consumer rights in the Medigap market. 
Most importantly, ten standardized insurance policies labeled A through J were 
established, medical underwriting was greatly restricted, and the purchase and sale 
of multiple plans was prohibited. These regulations came into effect in 1992 in all 
states but Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, where similar regulative 
measures had previously been introduced. The following sections will look in 
detail at the specific regulations.  
 
1.3.1.  Insurance Policy Restrictions 
Prior to OBRA-90, the coverage specified by insurance plans was subject only to 
the insurance companies. Although plans had to be approved by a state’s insurance 
commissioner, the specific benefits covered varied considerably across insurance 
firms. For the elderly, this complicated the comparison to find the optimal 
insurance plan for their needs, sometimes leading to duplicate coverage (Short and 
Vistnes, 1992).   
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Standardization was intended to increase the comparability of plan offers across 
insurance companies, which would hopefully enhance competition, lead to price 
reductions, and generate welfare gains for consumers. 
Table 1.1. shows the different coverage packages associated with each of the ten 
plan letters A through J.
1 All plans under OBRA-90 have to supply insurance for the 
following Medicare payments: Medicare part A coinsurance, part B coinsurance, and 
the costs of three pints of blood per year. The additional coverage packages include 
Medicare part A and B deductibles, skilled nursing facility (SNF) coinsurance, 
Medicare Part B excess charges, foreign travel emergency charges, at home recovery 
costs, prescription drugs, and preventive services that are covered by Medicare.  
While the coverage packages are specified as shown in Table 1.1., insurance 
companies are allowed to further distinguish into different categories. They can offer 
plans specifically for smokers, as well as “select” plans, which, for full insurance 
benefits, limit the customers to specific hospitals and medical providers.  
 
1.3.2.  The Open Enrollment Period 
An important restriction was the introduction of the “open enrollment” period. This 
period begins once a consumer turns 65 and enrolls in Medicare Part B and then 
lasts for six months. For example, a consumer who turned 65 on the 1
st of January 
in 1998, but enrolled in Medicare part B on April 1
st, the open enrollment ends on 
September 30
th. During the open enrollment period an insurance company has to 
accept an individual’s application regardless of his or her medical condition. Once 
the individual’s open enrollment period ends, firms are allowed to medically 
underwrite. In a few situations the consumer may purchase policies with 
                                                 
1 Table 1.1. reflects the plans as they were from 1992 to 2005, which embraces the period under 
investigation here. In 2005, two plans (K and L) were introduced that are similar to plan A but with 
catastrophic coverage. In addition, prescription drug coverage was moved into Medicare Part D.   
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guaranteed coverage even though she is not in her open enrollment period. 
Specifically, this is the case when a Medigap insurer goes bankrupt. In this case 
other insurers have to offer plans A, B, C, and F, without being able to underwrite.
2  
States have the possibility to go beyond the federal regulations for open 
enrollment. Currently, Connecticut and New York have “continuous” open enrollment 
periods (i.e. no underwriting at all), while California, Maine, and Massachusetts have 
an annual open enrollment period of one month around a person’s birthday (The 
Lewin Group, 2001).  
For individuals in most states, however, the decision to buy a Medigap insurance 
policy is confined to their open enrollment period: the potentially large premium 
increases that insurers can impose with medical underwriting outside an individual’s 
open enrollment period deters the individual from switching to a different Medigap 
policy. This limitation of the individual’s choice set imposes an undue weight on the 
decision taken in the open enrollment period. Indeed, in a related study, Rice, Snyder, 
Kominski, and Pourat (2002) find that only six percent of Medigap policy holders 
switch into Medicare Managed Care, which may give an indication of the small 
amount of turnovers within Medigap policies.  
 
1.3.3.  Rating Methods  
OBRA-90 also restricted the possibilities insurance companies have to set 
premiums in an individual’s open enrollment period. With underwriting limited to 
age, gender, and smoking status, insurance companies were left with few ways of 
varying premiums to match their risk exposure. In addition to varying premiums by 
gender and smoking status, they adopted three different methods of varying 
premiums by age: Attained Age Rating, Community Rating, and Issued Age 
                                                 
2 This was a provision added in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA-97).  
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Rating. Each method represents a different degree of risk pooling within an 
insurance plan.  
Attained Age plans vary premiums according to the consumer’s current age, 
whereas Community Rated plans pool all risks and charge the same premium to all 
policyholders regardless of age (although some differentiate by gender). Issued Age 
plans are based on the consumer’s buy-in age, not on her actual age, and therefore the 
same premium is charged to all individuals who bought at the same age, regardless of 
the year in which they first bought their policy. If an insurance company wishes to 
raise premiums, it must do so for all policyholders within the same rating class. For 
example, it is not possible for an insurer to increase the premium separately for the 
oldest people in a Community Rated or Issued Age plan – this would only be allowed 
in an Attained Age plan. 
An important consideration is how the premiums differ depending on the rating 
methods. While a detailed discussion of the three rating methods is presented in 
Chapter Two, the following differences in premiums are immediate: for younger 
individuals buying a Medigap plan, the Attained Age policies will be the least 
expensive, since they charge by age group, and younger individuals have lower health 
expenditures. Community Rated policies on the other hand impose the highest 
premiums, since the young individuals in the plan subsidize the old. (Issued Age plans 
will be in between the two.) With increasing age, this difference decreases, and the 
relationship reverses eventually. Each rating method also implies a different age 
profile in premiums. Attained Age plans feature a relatively low premium at age 65 
but a steeply rising premium profile with age, whereas Issued Age plans have higher 
age 65 premiums and less steeply rising premium profiles with age.
3 For Community 
                                                 
3 For Plan A, the average annual increase in premiums is about 3 percent for Attained Age rating in the 
first ten years, compared to 2.2 percent for Issued Age plans.  
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Rated plans, the age profile is flat, i.e. as the individual ages, her premiums adjusted 
for inflation are not rising. 
If one considers the different rating schemes, an obvious flaw seems to be present 
in the market – if Attained Age premiums are lowest when people are young, and the 
Community Rated premiums are lowest when old, why do older people not switch 
from an Attained Age plan to a Community Rated plan? If that were the case, the 
market for Community Rated plans would cease to exist, since the maintenance of 
lower premiums at older ages relies on the presence of younger (i.e., healthier) 
individuals in the plan population. This development is similar to the “adverse 
selection death spiral” mentioned for example by Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002) or 
Cutler and Reber (1998). 
However, as discussed in the previous section, the mechanism that prevents the 
death spiral is the institution of the one-time open enrollment period. Only for plans 
purchased in open enrollment are insurers prohibited from further underwriting. For a 
plan bought in the open enrollment period, the premium can only change for the whole 
group. However, since medical underwriting or even rejection is allowed once the 
consumer is not in her open enrollment period when buying a plan, switching from 
one plan to another, or from one company to another, might lead to substantial 
additional costs for the consumer.
4 Consequently, the market resembles a one-shot 
market: individuals enter the market once they enroll in Medicare Part B at an age of 
at least 65, purchase a Medigap plan, and do not actively participate in the market 
once their open enrollment period ends. This not only reduces the incentives to switch, 
                                                 
4 For example, in Arizona the Community Rated insurer United Health Care offers two rates per plan to 
people, who are out of their open enrollment period: A “preferred rate” and a “universal rate”, where 
the universal rate is priced 36% higher than the preferred rate. For plans A through G, “answers to 
health questions on [the] enrollment application will be used” to determine the applicant’s rate. For the 
high cost plans H, I, and J, the answers will determine eligibility as such. This pattern is found in 
several other states as well.  
Source: AARP web site, http://www.aarphealthcare.com/quote/index.aspx, accessed October 2005.  
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but also eliminates the consumer’s ability to learn and adjust in the market; purchasing 
“mistakes” cannot be fixed unless the consumer completely exits the Medigap 
market.
5  
 
1.3.4.  Other Regulations Under OBRA-90 
One restriction for companies in the Medigap market concerns the share of 
premiums collected from the insured that is used to cover the incurred medical 
costs, the so-called loss ratio. With OBRA-90 insurance companies were required 
to have loss ratios of at least 65 percent for policies issued to individuals and at 
least 75 percent for policies issued to groups.
6 Although insurance companies do 
not have to meet the loss ratio in the first years after the policy has been approved, 
the requirement reduces the firms’ potential to overprice their insurance policies. 
With the passage of OBRA-90, policies can no longer be canceled by the 
insurance company, as long as the customer pays the premiums. This guaranteed 
renewability of insurance policies provides stability to the insured, since the policy 
could not be discontinued on health grounds. Insurance companies were also 
prohibited to sell multiple insurance plans to one customer to avoid duplicate 
coverage. Fines of $5000 per policy are imposed if either of the above restrictions are 
violated.  
Finally, OBRA-90 introduced the “select” policies, allowing for a managed care 
alternative to standard Medigap. Although the plans have to correspond with the 
coverage packages shown in Table 1.1., insurance companies are allowed to restrict 
full benefits to the use of specific network providers. Originally, select policies were 
                                                 
5 Connecticut and New York, which both have a continuous open enrollment period, in addition 
implemented a mandatory Community Rating, such that there is no possibility to switch from Attained 
Age to Community Rated plans. 
6 Group policies are mainly those bought through an intermediate consumer agency, for example 
AARP.   
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introduced only in 15 states as an experiment, but in 1998, Congress extended the 
select option to all states. While the impact of this extension on the regular Medigap 
market is not clear (see for example Lee et al, 1997), insurance companies make little 
use of this low-cost option, with about six percent of policies offered being “select” in 
2000. 
 
1.4.  An Excerpt Of The Previous Literature On The Medigap Market 
Before OBRA-90 was implemented, Rice (1987) investigated efficiency and 
competition in the Medigap market. While a competitive price cannot be found 
easily because policies at that point were not comparable, his findings suggests that 
individuals do not purchase the coverage they need due to lack of information. He 
concludes that major changes to the (pre-OBRA-90) Medigap market are necessary 
to increase consumer welfare.  
The evaluation of OBRA-90 is the focus of Fox, Snyder, and Rice (2003). They 
conclude that the legislation overall was successful, since consumer confusion was 
reduced as well as the number of complaints about insurance abuses. On the other 
hand, they do not find evidence that the price competition has increased in the period 
from 1990 to 2000. Lee, Garfinkel, Khandker, and Norton (1997) investigate the 
impact of introducing the “select” option to the Medigap market with a quasi 
experimental approach in those states that were implementing it first under OBRA-90. 
The results are somewhat unsatisfactory: in five states, the costs increase, whereas in 
the remaining six states under investigation they either remain constant or decline with 
the introduction of select policies. 
A number of studies have concentrated on an adverse selection aspect of the 
Medigap market. As in any insurance market, the individuals in poorer health will buy 
more health insurance and have higher rates of utilization, thereby increasing  
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premiums and driving healthier individuals out until the market collapses – the 
“adverse selection death spiral”, see for example Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002) or 
Cutler and Reber (1998). The findings, however, are mixed. Wolfe and Goddeeris 
(1991) provide some evidence for adverse selection in the Medigap market, although 
the premium increases caused by adverse selection are rather small. They note that 
individuals with better health tend to have higher rates of Medigap insurance, which 
might be attributed to the Medicaid option that is available to the poor. Ettner (1997) 
uses the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) and compares Medigap policy 
holders to those individuals with employer provided supplemental insurance. She finds 
that Medigap policy holders have significantly higher expenditures and interprets this 
(under the assumption of exogenous coverage choice) as evidence for adverse 
selection into the Medigap market. Opposite to these results, Fang, Keane, and 
Silverman (2006) use the MCBS in combination with the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) to conclude that there is advantageous selection into Medigap insurance: 
healthier individuals  with lower health care expenditures risks are more likely to buy 
Medigap policies.  
Tied closely to the problem of selection is that of moral hazard, see Wolfe and 
Goddeeris (1991), Ettner 1997, or Fang et al. (2006). Since Medigap is a supplement 
to Medicare, and Medicare still pays shares of the costs, the premiums are lower than 
the marginal costs of the utilization, thus leading to inefficient levels of use of medical 
care. All of the mentioned studies find utilization rates that are too high, causing an 
additional burden on the Medicare budget. 
 
1.5.  Weiss Data And Premium Variation 
The main data source used in this dissertation is premium data provided by Weiss 
Ratings, Inc. The data span a time horizon of 5 years, from 1998 to 2002, and for  
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each year contain the prices of Medigap policies as of January 1
st of that year.
7 The 
Weiss data capture about 91 percent of all firms operating nationwide, and are 
voluntarily provided by insurance companies. Firms report their premiums for the 
Medigap plan letters they offer by gender, age, standard, smoking or select status, 
rating method, and zip code. The data also include the Weiss financial safety rating 
for each insurance firm (A+ to F).
8  
Medigap policies within a certain plan letter can be regarded as homogenous 
products, since to the consumer, they offer the same observable benefits. Economic 
theory suggests, that these homogenous products are priced identically in a 
competitive market. In the following section, I specifically define a homogenous 
product for the Medigap market, while section 1.5.2. will look at some examples of 
the premium variation within these homogenous products. 
 
1.5.1.  Defining Homogenous Products 
As Table 1.1. shows, the ten standard Medigap plans provide different degrees of 
coverage. These coverage differences will lead to cost differences, which in turn 
will lead to premium differences; thus, premiums are expected to vary across plan 
letters. Premiums will also vary within plan letter on those dimensions permitted 
by law: gender, smoking status, select status, and age. For example, a smoker will 
pay more for Plan A than a non-smoker, and men will sometimes pay a different 
premium than women. As discussed in section 1.3.3., Attained Age premiums will 
                                                 
7 For Chapter Four, only the premiums of 1998 are used.  
8 There are more types of plans, e.g. preferred or select-smoking plans. Since the cell sizes become 
small, they are omitted here. Weiss also reports whether the policy is a “guaranteed” issue plan. These 
are not plans sold in open enrollment periods but those where customers decide to forgo a waiting 
period to have coverage guaranteed. These plans also suffer from small sample sizes, and there also 
seem to be some measurement issues. Thus the sample is also restricted to non-guaranteed plans. The 
restrictions applied to the sample (non-guaranteed, standard, select or smoker plans) reduces the sample 
by about twelve percent.   
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generally be lower than Issued Age and Community Rated premiums at younger 
ages, but will be higher at older ages. 
An important consideration is the geographic area relevant to insurance firms. 
Firms operating in the Medigap market report their premiums to Weiss on a zip code 
level. Although insurers are free to vary prices by zip code or county, the premium 
data show that most variation occurs across rather than within states. For example, of 
the 47 firms offering plan F to 65 year-old women in Illinois, 29 (62 percent) charge 
the same premium in every zip code.
9 The remaining 18 firms have a mean within-
firm coefficient of variation of 6.1 percent, leading to an average within-firm 
coefficient of variation of 2.3 percent in Illinois. Most other states show a similar 
pattern (see Appendix Table 1.1.). This lack of variation within a firm and state is not 
altogether surprising: insurance companies are subject to regulations and reporting 
requirements that vary by state (e.g., open enrollment or loss ratio requirements), not 
by county or zip code. In addition, data on covered lives from the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (described in Chapter Four) suggest that for 
most firms the number of policyholders per zip code or county may be too small to 
adjust the premiums for risks that are specific to small geographic areas. In sum, the 
Weiss data suggest that states are the relevant “local” markets in most cases. 
In all analyses that follow, policies of the same plan letter, gender, smoking 
status, select status, rating method, and age, which are offered in the same state, are 
considered to be homogenous goods and hence are perfect substitutes for one another. 
This consideration allows to aggregate the premium data to a state level, i.e. to reduce 
the data to one observation per firm and homogenous product. 
 
                                                 
9 Note that all rating types are considered together here. Since firms that operate in more than one rating 
method (less than 2 percent of all firms) are not considered in the analysis, the variation in premiums 
within a firm is not caused by the rating method.   
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1.5.2. Premium  Variation 
As mentioned above, one main goal of OBRA-90 was to increase the competition 
among firms thereby decreasing the premium variation. Despite these efforts, 
considerable premium variation still exists among Medigap policies that are otherwise 
identical, i.e. homogenous as defined in the previous section.  
        
        
Table 1.2.: Premium Variation In Ten States: 
Attained Age Standard Plans F offered to 65 Year-Old Women 1998 
        
State Mean CV  Min  Max 90/10 75/25  Offers
AZ   1185 0.14  869 1630 1.45 1.24  30 
CA   1205 0.25  456 1911 1.68 1.43  24 
IL   1069 0.15  774 1604 1.33 1.15  35 
KS   1072 0.14  789 1466 1.50 1.16  29 
NH   970 0.18 724 1323  1.70 1.26  14 
NJ   1035 0.11  845 1134 1.34 1.07  5 
PA   1071 0.11  977 1204 1.23 1.23  3 
TN   1064 0.17  784 1623 1.35 1.15  31 
TX   1142 0.14  874 1630 1.41 1.14  33 
WY   1083 0.24  761 1826 1.71 1.10  23 
 
Notes:  
All values are for Attained Age standard plans F sold to 65 year-old women. 
“90
th/10
th ” and “75th/25
th “ show the ratio of the 90
th to the 10
th and the 75
th to the 25
th 
percentile, respectively. Means, Minimum, and Maximum in 1998 Dollars. 
        
        
While there is substantial variation nationwide, some of this variation is expected 
on account of differences in the costs of operating in different states. Table 1.2. 
shows how prices for Plan F vary within states, focusing on Attained Age plans in 
an arbitrary group of ten states. All of the within-state CV’s are above 0.10, with 
two out of the ten above 0.20 (California and Wyoming), suggesting considerable  
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within-state variation in premiums.
10 In some states, the range of premiums is quite 
large. For example, premiums for identical Plan F policies in California range from 
a low of $456 to a high of $1911, a fourfold difference. This spread is not merely 
due to outliers, as the ratio of the 90
th over 10
th percentiles is 1.7 and that of the 
75
th over 25
th percentile is 1.4. The average premium differs substantially across 
states, indicating the presence of state-specific cost differences. Appendix Table 
1.2. displays the complete listing of coefficients of variation all states and plan 
letters, confirming that significant price variation persists in all states and for all 
policies. 
Table 1.3. illustrates the premium variation for the example of Illinois in 1998, 
restricted to standard plans under Attained Age rating offered to 65 year-old women. 
Depicted are yearly premium means, coefficients of variation (CV), minimum (Min), 
maximum (Max), the ratios of the 90
th to the 10
th and 75
th to the 25
th percentile, and 
the number of offers each plan letter has.  
Although Table 1.3. only contains policies sold in Illinois in 1998, several 
observations from this specific state and year hold in general for the Medigap market. 
Plans A, C, and F, are offered the most. The average premium in general increases 
with the amount of coverage, i.e. the more comprehensive plans charge higher 
premiums (compare to coverage packages in Table 1.1.). Especially large differences 
exist between plans that cover prescription drugs (H, I, J) and those that do not, with 
an average difference of $741. Those plans also experience more variation than plans 
A through G, although the variation in premiums is substantial in general. Coefficients 
of variation reach up to 37 percent (plan H) and ranges of premiums are more than 
                                                 
10 The coefficients of variation reported here for the Medigap market are comparable to those noted in 
other studies of price dispersion in markets for homogeneous goods. For example, Sorensen (2000) 
reports an average CV of 0.22 in retail prescription drug markets, and Dahlby and West (1986) report 
examples of .0739 and .1796 for the automobile insurance industry.  
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$2000 for plan J. In addition, the percentiles ratios show that this spread is not due to 
outliers. Interestingly, the number of offers plays little role in the amount of variation. 
 
 
Table 1.3.: Premium Variation For Standard Plans In Illinois 1998 
        
Plan Mean CV  Min Max  90/10  75/25  Offers
A  569 0.20 399 948 1.71 1.34  39 
B  817 0.18 581 1312  1.53 1.24  29 
C  970 0.18 677 1590  1.49 1.23  36 
D  846 0.20 632 1410  1.40 1.23  18 
E  911 0.25 650 1512  1.78 1.40  15 
F  1069 0.15  774 1604 1.33 1.15  35 
G  947 0.14 691 1181  1.44 1.18  13 
H  1374 0.37  915 2440 2.67 1.47  7 
I  1536 0.19 1174 2072 1.48 1.44  11 
J  1942 0.35 1365 3555 2.60 1.42  9 
 
Notes:  
All values are for Attained Age standard plans sold to 65 year-old women in Illinois 
only. “90
th/10
th ” and “75th/25
th “ show the ratio of the 90
th to the 10
th and the 75
th to 
the 25
th percentile, respectively. Means, Minimum, and Maximum in 1998 Dollars. 
        
        
This first look at the data suggests that despite the regulations of OBRA-90, prices 
continue to vary substantially between companies offering the same Medigap 
plans. Reports from Weiss (Weiss Ratings Inc., 1997-2006) indicate that this 
problem still persists in the Medigap market today. The existence of premium 
variation in a market with homogeneous goods is an indicator of imperfect 
information in the market (Stiglitz, 1989), and suggests that when consumers buy 
high-priced Medigap policies instead of identical lower-priced ones, welfare losses 
occur.  
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1.6. Summary 
This chapter provides important background information about the market for 
supplemental Medicare insurance, specifically the Medigap market. The main 
changes introduced by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 are discussed 
alongside a brief assessment of the economic changes this legislation has imposed 
on the market. In section 1.5. I introduce to the main data source of this 
dissertation, the premium data from Weiss Ratings, Inc. After defining 
homogenous products in the Medigap market, I show that significant premium 
variation exists.  
The premium variation is the core of this dissertation: Chapter Two focuses on 
premium variation that is caused by differences in the population an insurance firm 
covers and relates the resulting simulated differences to the premium differentials that 
are actually observed. Chapter Three determines how specific coverage packages are 
priced and investigates the development of premium variation over time, especially 
with respect to implications for competition in the Market. In Chapter Four one reason 
for the sustained premium variation, search costs to consumers, is investigated and 
shown to be a major determinant.  
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1.7. Appendix  Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1.1: Average Coefficient of Variation of  
Within Firm Insurance Premiums 
                
         PLAN     
STATE  A B C D E F G H I  J 
  AK  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  AL  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  AR  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  AZ  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  CA  0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 
  CO  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  CT  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  DC  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  DE  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  FL  0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 
  GA  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
  HI  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  IA  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  ID  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  IL  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  IN  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  KS  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  KY  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  LA  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  MD  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  ME  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  MI  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  MO  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  MS  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1.1: (continued) 
            
       PLAN      
STATE  A B C D E F G H I  J 
  MT  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  NC  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  ND  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  NE  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  NH  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  NJ  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00        0.00       
  NM  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  NV  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 
  NY  0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 
  OH  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  OK  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  OR  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  PA  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 
  RI  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  SC  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  SD  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  TN  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  TX  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
  UT  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  VA  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
  VT  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00        0.00         0.00 
  WA  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  WV  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  WY  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Notes:  
Within each firm, the state-plan coefficient of variation for premiums of plans offered to 65 
year-old women are computed from all zip-codes the firm operates in in 1998. Each state-plan 
cell contains the average over these coefficients of variation in that cell. Firms that operate in 
more than one rating scheme (2% of all firms) were dropped from the analysis.  
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss Ratings data, 1998. 
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Appendix Table 1.2: Coefficients of Variation of Insurance Premiums 
                
         PLAN     
STATE  A B C D E F G H I  J 
  AK  0.13 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.20 
  AL  0.20 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.29 0.18 0.28 
  AR  0.20 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.31 0.26 0.30 
  AZ  0.22 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.23 
  CA  0.26 0.22 0.28 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.14 0.28 
  CO  0.22 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.30 0.32 0.29 
  CT  0.27 0.07 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.51 0.55 0.22 
  DC  0.11 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.12 
  DE  0.16 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.12 
  FL  0.20 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.28 0.13 
  GA  0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.31 0.23 0.31 
  HI  0.21 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.18 0.15 
  IA  0.23 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.11 0.19 0.26 
  ID  0.25 0.21 0.27 0.25  0.21  0.20 0.18 0.37 0.33 0.22 
  IL  0.20 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.29 0.19 0.32 
  IN  0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.28 0.14 0.28 
  KS  0.20 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.20 
  KY  0.16 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.26 0.31 0.14 
  LA  0.18 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.18 
  MD  0.21 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.13 0.32 0.25 0.32 
  ME  0.19 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.86 0.69 0.19 
  MI  0.22 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.35 0.39 0.21 
  MO  0.16 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.25 0.13 0.19 
  MS  0.21 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.22 
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Appendix Table 1.2: (continued) 
    
     PLAN  
STATE  A B C D E F G H I  J 
  MT  0.16 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.27 
  NC  0.23 0.21 0.25 0.16 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.31 0.21 0.32 
  ND  0.16 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.21 
  NE  0.20 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.14 0.18 
  NH  0.14 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.24 
  NJ  0.18  0.14  0.13  0.08  0.00  0.10  0.09        0.04       
  NM  0.19 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.19 
  NV  0.22 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.19 
  NY  0.12 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.21 0.02 0.18 
  OH  0.21 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.22 
  OK  0.24 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.16 0.29 
  OR  0.25 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.23 
  PA  0.19 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.29 
  RI  0.23 0.21 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.21 0.24 0.13 0.18 0.17 
  SC  0.17 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.17 0.22 
  SD  0.20 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.25 0.19 0.17 
  TN  0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.33 0.23 0.27 
  TX  0.20 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.18 0.24 
  UT  0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.23 
  VA  0.16 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.21 
  VT  0.13  0.11  0.07  0.11  0.03  0.00        0.03         0.04 
  WA  0.19 0.20 0.15 0.09 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.27 0.49 0.16 
  WV  0.22 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.32 0.20 0.21 
  WY  0.25 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.25 
 
Notes:  
The table shows the coefficients of variation for standard plans offered to 65 year-old women 
in 1998. The coefficients of variation are generated within each rating method. The cells depict 
the mean of these in the specific state-plan cell. Cells without entries do not have any offers.  
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss Ratings data, 1998. 
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2.CHAPTER TWO 
SIMULATING MEDIGAP PREMIUMS 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter explains how actuarially fair premiums of otherwise identical 
insurance firms vary due to differences in the respective populations that are 
covered by the firms. The formation of premiums under the different rating 
methods is presented in detail, followed by premium simulations using different 
plan population scenarios. The comparison of variation created in these simulations 
and the actual variation in the market suggests, that at least for parts of the market, 
differences in consumers’ age distributions could account for large parts of the 
premium differences between insurance companies.  
The next section is concerned with the details of the rating methods and the 
implications that each has on the premium formation. Section 2.3 then introduces the 
data that is used as basis for the simulations presented in sections 2.4. The final section 
2.5. concludes this chapter with a summary and discussion of the results.  
 
2.2. Rating  Methods 
Theoretically, insurance policies can be distinguished by their degree of risk 
pooling or risk separation. If a separating contract is taken to the extreme, each 
consumer pays a premium according to his or her personal risk (see for example 
Arrow, 1963). On the other hand, in an extreme pooling contract all people covered 
by an insurer are paying the same premium, without consideration of their risk 
factors. As outlined in section 1.3.3., Attained Age, Issued Age and Community 
Rating are the rating methods used in the Medigap market. Of these three,  
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Community Rating would be the most risk pooling, Attained Age Rating the most 
risk separating method. In general however, the risk specifications allowed by the 
regulations are relatively few, so that this market can be classified as having a 
large degree of risk pooling.  
In what follows, the rating methods are compared based on actuarially fair 
premiums, i.e. the expected medical expenditures. The concentration here is on age 
differences causing differences in premiums, as basically the differences in gender, 
smoking, or select status affect all rating methods equally, whereas differences in the 
age distribution have different implications for each of them. (Note that the impact of 
regional risk diversification will be considered in the next chapter.) 
Within each rating method, there is a group of individuals for which the premium 
is constant. For Attained Age plans, this will be an age group, for Issued Age plans, it 
is the group of people that bought into the plan at a specific age, and for Community 
Rated plans it is the whole plan population. The costs of each of these groups form the 
basis of the actuarially fair premiums considered in this analysis. 
For any rating method, individual i in age group a files claims (or “produces” 
costs) Cai with the insurance company. Let Ea[C] denote the expected or average costs 
for an individual in age group a. As the individuals can buy into Medigap only when 
65 or older, a ranges from 65 to the maximum age covered by the plan, denoted by A 
(the analysis has a maximum age of 100 years). na is the number of people in age 
group a covered by the insurer; N denotes the total number of people covered by the 
policy. 
Premiums for Attained Age ratings (P
AA) will be based on the expected costs of 
each age group, i.e. all people of the same age covered by the same insurance 
company pay the same premium. The index a in the following formula labels an age  
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group within an insurance company. Overall, the insurer covers (A-64) different age 
groups and thus can charge as many different premiums: 
 (2.1)  [] C E C
n
P a
n
i
ai
a
AA
a
a
= = ∑
=1
1
,   a = 65, 66, …, A. 
Abstracting from inflation and real increases in medical costs, as long as average 
claims rise with age, the actuarially fair premium P
AA has to increase if an 
individual turns a year older. Thus a rational individual will expect to pay less now 
and more in the future in real terms, even if medical costs in each age group 
remain constant. 
Actuarially fair premiums in Community Rated plans (P
CR) are based on the 
average claims of all individuals covered by the insurer: 
 (2.2)  [] [] C E C E
N
n
C
n
n
N
C
N
P
A
a
a
a
n
i
ai
a
a
A
a
n
i
ai
A
a
CR
a a
= = = = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = = = 65 1 65 1 65
1 1
 
The fraction na/N in equation (2.2) denotes the proportion of people covered by the 
insurer who are in age group a, and at the same time, it is the weight for the 
average claims this group imposes on the insurer in relation to the whole plan 
population. The last term in equation (2.2), E[C], denotes the average or expected 
costs taken over the whole population covered by this plan. The premium for a 
Community Rated plan does not depend on the individual’s age, and if expected 
costs and the age distribution remain constant (i.e. na/N is constant over time for all 
a), the premium is fixed over a person’s life. 
The Issued Age rating can be best described as Community Rating with greater 
risk separation. Actuarially fair premiums are based on the expected claims of all 
policyholders who bought in at the same age, regardless of their current age. For 
example, if person X bought a policy at age 66 in 1994 and person Y bought the same 
policy at age 66 in 2000, in 2003 they both pay the exact same premium, even though  
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X is six years older than Y. Let B denote the “buy-in” age for any group, and NB the 
number of people who bought in at age B. (Note that all ages between buy-in age B 
and maximum age A are present in NB.) Then the following formula applies for Issued 
Age premiums (P
IA) with a buy-in age of B
11: 
 (2.3)  [] ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = = =
= = =
A
B a
a
B
a
n
i
ai
A
B a a
a
B
n
i
ai
A
B a B
IA
B C E
N
n
C
n
n
N
C
N
P
a a
1 1
1 1
,   B=65, 66, …A.  
Similar to Community Rated plans, without increases in health costs and with a 
constant age distribution within a buy-in group, there is no change in premiums for 
Issued Age plans. If in addition the buy-in age is fixed, i.e. every individual has to 
buy at the same age, say 65 years, NB in equation (2.3) is identical to N in equation 
(2.2), and the Issued Age premium is identical to the Community Rated premium.  
As costs to the insurer are increasing with age, and an increase in buy-in age 
results in higher premiums since younger people will not be present, a person buying 
an Issued Age plan will pay more, the later she buys in.
12 This also suggests that an 
Issued Age plan with a buy-in age greater than 65 can compete with a Community 
Rated plan only if it has a cost advantage in the individuals covered by the plan. This 
for example is the case if the Community Rated plan covers a larger number of older 
(thus unhealthy and more costly) people than the Issued Age plan.  
Most of the following analysis is conducted comparing Community Rated and 
Attained Age plans. Unless otherwise noted, the results hold in a similar fashion for 
the comparison of Issued Age plans and Attained Age plans.  
                                                 
11 We abstract here from the fact that insurance companies in general have a maximum buy-in age, 
which usually is around 80 years. Taking this into account would reduce the relevant number Issued 
Age plans, but not affect the premium calculation. 
12 Intuitively, an Issued Age plan with a buy-in age of 70 will not cover any person between 65 and 69, 
and since these age groups have lower costs on average, an Issued Age plan with a buy-in age of 70 has 
to charge higher premiums to cover its costs.  
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Equations (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) confirm in detail findings from Chapter One: 
different rating schemes themselves cause some variation in Medigap premiums 
within an otherwise homogenous product. Specifically the buy-in age matters: 
consider for example a 65-year old comparing Attained Age and Community Rated 
premiums in her decision to buy a Medigap plan. Since, following equation (2.1), the 
Attained Age premium 
AA P 65  is only based on the expected costs of all 65 year-olds in 
this insurance company, this premium will be lower than the premium for a 
Community Rated plan, P
CR, assuming that this insurer has to average over multiple 
age cohorts.
13 There exists a buy-in age, at which the premium for Attained Age plans 
is higher than the premium for Community Rated plans. As will be shown in the 
simulation section in 2.4., with actuarially fair premiums based on the total medical 
costs, this buy-in age is at 75 for men and at 77 for women. Note that even between 
two Community Rated insurers there can be differentials in actuarially fair premiums, 
if the age distributions of their policyholders differ. Consider an example of two 
Community Rated plans, where the first covers relatively younger individuals, and the 
second covers relatively older people. The first insurer’s premiums will be lower, 
since average costs will be lower. However, as the plan population ages, and thus the 
age distribution of the first policy shifts to the right, the insurer faces higher costs and 
hence has to raise its premium. The effects of different age distributions on costs are 
investigated in detail in section 2.4. 
As discussed in section 1.3.3., there are barriers in the Medigap market that might 
deter individuals from switching Medigap policies after the open enrollment period. 
Thus, to the rational consumer an important consideration is not only the comparison 
of premiums at the buy-in age but also the expected total lifetime premium she has to 
pay. Again the different ratings yield differences in lifetime premiums, and depending 
                                                 
13 Appendix table A2.1. shows how total medical costs increase with age from age 65-100.  
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on the life expectancy at buy-in age, any rating could be better than another. Holding 
constant changes in health care costs, inflation, and changes in the population 
distribution, in general a long-lived individual will be better off in a Community Rated 
plan than in an Attained Age plan. While the Attained Age premiums will be based on 
average costs in the age group, young people in Community Rated plans overpay 
when young, but underpay when old, and hence the older someone is, the larger will 
be the benefit of underpayment in a Community Rated plan. By the same reasoning, a 
short-lived individual will be better off in an Attained Age plan. The age at buy-in will 
influence the decision between ratings as well: only for the young is there a benefit of 
enrolling in an Attained Age plan, thus the older a person is when buying a Medigap 
plan, the better off she will be with a Community Rated plan.  
From the insurer’s perspective, an Attained Age insurer will be interested in 
covering healthy individuals – in any age group, they will yield positive profits, if the 
premium is based on expected costs. However, under certain circumstances a 
Community Rated insurer might be interested in insuring sick individuals. This would 
be the case if they buy in young and die young, and their lifetime costs remain below 
the lifetime costs of the average covered person. The incentives for insurers and 
consumers are opposite, since expected costs to consumers are expected revenues to 
insurers. 
The decision to buy into a certain rating may not only depend on the present value 
of premium streams, however. Another aspect is how shocks to the risk pool are 
translated into shifts in premiums, depending on the rating’s degree of risk pooling. 
Consider first the Attained Aged plans, where any shock to a specific age group will 
only affect that group. For example, if a group of healthy seventy year-olds decided to 
buy into an Attained Age plan, the premium would only change (decrease) within this 
group, and if the new group continued to be healthier, the whole present value of  
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premiums would be shifted down, but only for the specific age group. In a Community 
Rated plan, all individuals enrolled are affected by a shock to a specific age group (in 
the example, all people benefit from the healthier individuals with lower premiums). 
However, since the premiums are averaged over all individuals, the impact on 
premiums is smaller than for Attained Age ratings. Since unexpected premium 
changes will be smaller in a Community Rated plan than in an Attained Age plan, a 
more risk averse an individual is better off with a Community Rated plan. 
The above considerations are well reflected in the actual markets. Table 2.1. 
shows premiums differences split by the rating method and by age for standard 
premiums offered to women in 2002, without distinguishing by plan letter.  
     
 
Table 2.1.: Average Premiums Split By Age And Rating Method In 2002
     
  Age At Which The Policy Is Bought 
  65 75 85 
Attained Age  1206 1636 1942 
 
(421) (561) (677) 
Issued Age  1419 1721 1955 
 
(519) (647) (749) 
Community Rating  1544 1550 1553 
 
(607) (612) (616) 
 
Notes:  
Depicted are premiums for standard plans offered to women at the different age 
groups in 2002. Standard deviations are depicted in parenthesis. 
Source: Author's calculations using Weiss data, 2002. 
     
     
Within a rating method, the means increase with the buy-in age for Issued Age and 
Attained Age ratings, as expected from equations (2.1) and (2.3). Community  
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Rated plans should be the same across age following equation (2.2). There is some 
variation here, because not all insurance firms offer their plan to all buy-in groups. 
Across rating methods, the values are in line with the equations as well: at a buy-in 
age of 65, Attained Age plans are 15 percent less expensive than Issued Age and 
22 percent less expensive than Community Rated plans. The Community Rated 
plans are on average 9 percent more expensive than the Issued Age plans for the 65 
year-old buy-in group, which, as will be shown below, is likely due to the fact that 
not everybody buys into the Community Rated plan at age 65. As the buy-in age is 
increased, the differences are reversed: at a buy-in age of 75 (85), Community 
Rated plans on average cost only 95 percent (80 percent) of an Attained Age plan. 
The standard deviation in premiums is one measure of the premium variation. 
Interestingly, while the premium variation  remains almost constant for Community 
Rated plans, both Attained Age and Issued Age plans experience an increase in 
premium variation when the buy-in age is increased.  
 
2.3. Simulation  Data 
To be able to accurately predict premiums and their development, this analysis 
firstly requires estimates of medical costs depending on age. The data source for 
these medical costs is the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), a survey 
administered by the Research Data Assistance Center (ResDAC). The MCBS is a 
nationally representative panel survey of Medicare beneficiaries, providing 
demographic and socioeconomic measures as well as information on health status 
and health care utilization and expenditures. The sample is restricted to individuals 
65 and older, where the group of 100 year-olds encompasses all individuals 100 
years old and older. The years available are 1992-2002, for each of which the  
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health care expenditures by age group and gender are reported – overall 792 cells.
14 
Each of these cells contains a value for the mean medical expenditures (weighted 
by the MCBS population weights), which is then deflated to year 2000 dollars by a 
medical care consumer price index (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). Then an 
expenditure function is obtained by regressing the logarithm of the real 
expenditures on age separately for men and women, taking into account that the 
samples become smaller with older individuals by using the number of people in 
each cell as a frequency weight.
15 (Results of this regression are shown in 
Appendix Table 2.2.)  
Secondly, to be able to project how the premiums develop with age, it is 
important to know how likely it is that an individual that bought a Medigap policy 
actually survives until her next birthday. The Census’ intercensal data (Census 2005a) 
are used to generate the survival rates for each age cohort (65-98) and gender for 
1990-1999. This leads to a total of 612 survival probabilities for these years, which are 
used to estimate the probabilities of death (results are depicted in Appendix Table 
2.3.). 
In the simulations, the main interest is not on the actual number of people in a 
plan, but rather on what fraction of the age distribution these people contribute to the 
specific policy population.
16 These fractions are calculated using the estimated death 
probabilities estimated from the Census data. Appendix Table 2.4. shows the 
distribution of these fractions over the age groups from 65 to 100.  
                                                 
14 Appendix Table A2.1. shows the distribution of expenditures by age averaged over 1992-2002. 
15 Since the costs used here are actual expenditures, the values presented here will be larger than the 
actual premiums found in the Medigap market. First, costs of all illnesses are considered, whereas any 
Medigap plan will only cover specific conditions, and second, Medigap policies do not cover all costs, 
but are only supplements to Medicare, which covers substantial parts of the costs as well. However, 
while the premiums then are not directly comparable, the trends shown in section 2.4. will still be valid 
for the plans, up to differences in coverage for age specific illnesses. 
16 To see this, consider any of the premium formulas (2.1) – (2.3). In each of them, the premium 
depends on the expected medical costs of different age groups, but not on the number of people itself.  
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2.4. Simulations 
In this section actuarially fair premiums are simulated, where different premium 
paths are compared using the results from the regressions with the actual medical 
cost and life-table data.
17  
The discussion in section 2.2. indicates that an important factor for Community 
Rated and Issued Age plans is the age distribution of individuals. Hence first a steady 
state for both of these rating methods is defined:  
Definition:  A steady state for a Community Rated or Issued Age plan is 
characterized by a fixed age distribution over time. That is, the fraction of the plan 
population in each age group remains constant over time. 
Appendix Table 2.4 shows the implied steady state distributions for men and 
women as specified in the previous section. This distribution will vary across the 
chapter to show the impact of changes and differences in the age distribution on 
actuarially fair premiums. First, however, the steady state distribution will be used to 
compare the Attained Age plans with the Community Rated and Issued Age plans as a 
benchmark.  
The assumption is that insurers base their premiums on the same information on 
costs and survival probabilities as this analysis does, i.e. using the MCBS and the 
Census’ population data from 1990 to 1999. The insurer collects premiums on a 
person’s birthday and constructs the premium using the survival probability of the 
individual until her next birthday. Implicitly we assume, that the insurer will have to 
pay for the individual’s health care costs only if she survives the whole year. The age 
dependent survival rates allow the insurer to calculate expected costs for each age 
                                                 
17 The analysis is limited to a point in time, abstracting from dynamic effects like demand 
responsiveness and adverse selection. While those considerations might be important, they are beyond 
the scope of this analysis.  
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group and base the premiums on those accordingly. Note that with increasing age, the 
premiums are more and more influenced by the chances of death, i.e. even though the 
actual costs of a 95 year-old might be high, the expected costs will be discounted 
heavily due to the smaller chances of survival. 
 
2.4.1. Benchmarks 
Figures 2.1. and 2.2. show the benchmark cases for the three different rating 
methods, where the implicit assumption is made that any buying individual is in 
his/her open enrollment period and cannot be subject to underwriting. The 
benchmark case for men is shown in Figure 2.1. The Attained Age plan 
experiences lower costs (and thus can charge lower premiums) for younger people, 
but as covered people get older, the costs outgrow the premiums for Community 
Rated plans. The switching point where a Community Rated premium is lower than 
an Attained Age premium is at 75 years. An individual (without discounting future 
payments) is better off with an Attained Age plan only if he dies before the age of 
85 – at this point the overall sum of premiums is lower in a Community Rated 
plan. Introducing a 5 percent discount rate, an Attained Age plan is worth it as long 
as the individual dies before the age of 90. 
For Issued Age plans, three different buy-in ages are shown (note that since in the 
Community Rated plan everybody buys in at age 65, there is no need to show an 
Issued Age plan of this buy-in age). With every increase in buy-in age by five 
years, the Issued Age premium increases buy roughly 11 percent. Again, the point 
can be calculated at which the Issued Age plans with these buy-in ages have lower 
sums of premiums than an Attained Age plan bought at that respective age. 
Compared to the Community Rated plans, they are later: for the buy-in ages of 70, 
75, and 80, these turning points are at 87, 88, and 90 years respectively.   
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Figure 2.2. shows the benchmark for women. While there slight differences 
compared to men in the rate of increase (women face higher expected costs with 
increasing age and have a higher chance of survival), the graph of premium 
development by age looks almost the same. The switching point is at age 77, two years 
later than for men. When comparing lifetime payment without discounting, a woman 
will be better off with a Community Rated plan after age 89, with 5 percent 
discounting, this threshold increases to age 95. Similar to the series for men, the later 
the buy-in age in an Issued Age plan, the higher the premium and the longer an 
individual has to survive to make the purchase of that plan worth it compared to the 
Attained Age plan. 
Since the Medigap Market as it is now exists only since 1992, it is worth looking 
at differences in premiums depending on the time the plan is already in business. For 
Attained Age plans, there will be no changes in the premiums, if we assume that the 
premiums are set according to the expected costs in an age group. However, for 
Community Rated and Issued Age plans, the premiums will change over time, 
especially if the age at which people buy into a plan is at 65 (or younger ages in 
general). This will mean that the Community Rater that just entered the market is not 
in the steady state yet, and will approach the steady state premium from below, as the 
age distribution builds up. This leads to a price advantage for the “younger” plan. 
 
2.4.2.  Different Ages At The Point Of Buying A Policy 
For the Community Rated plans, it was so far assumed, that the age at which 
people buy the plan, is restricted to 65. However, as mentioned before, the longer 
an individual expects to live the better off she would be buying a Community 
Rated plan. In addition, the later in her life she decides to buy Medicare Part B, 
and thus enters the open enrollment period, the better off she would be with a  
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Community Rated plan compared to an Attained Age plan with respect to total 
lifetime premiums paid. As figure 2.1. shows for men, buying into Attained Age 
plans being 75 and older does not make any sense, as lifetime premiums will be 
lower in Community Rated plans without uncertainty.  
It is interesting to investigate what influence the fact that people are allowed to 
buy in later than 65 has on the premiums. To an Attained Age plan, these people do 
not matter in terms of their premium, as long as the expected costs do not change. 
However, adding extra people to the Community Rated plan will distort the plan’s 
initial age distribution, and compared to a plan where everybody has to buy in at age 
65, more older people will be in the plan and the age distribution shifts left. As older 
people have higher costs, this situation leads to higher premiums for the entire plan 
population.  
Figure 2.3. investigates the usual Community Rated plans with the addition that 
people do not necessarily buy in at the age of 65. However, the assumption of a 
constant age distribution is maintained, i.e. the plan is in a steady state, where the 
same number of people enter and leave each age group in each year, such that each 
age group’s fraction in the total plan population remains constant. All premiums are 
depicted as a fraction of a benchmark premium, which is when everybody buys in at 
age 65. This is useful, since the calculated dollar amounts will not relate directly to the 
actual premiums in the Medigap market, whereas the ratios provide a good indication 
of how premiums change relatively due to a change in the buy-in behavior.  
The benchmark is depicted by the solid line in figure 2.3., showing the mean 
expenses when everybody buys the plan being 65 years old (and then remain in the 
plan until they die). Then the premiums depending on a “latest allowed buy-in age” 
(LABA) are simulated. The LABA is a measure of the age groups that buy into the  
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plan. For example, with a LABA of 75, the buy-in age is distributed between 65 
and 75. 
Figure 2.3. shows three specific scenarios, where a fictional population of 65 year-
olds is split into a fraction that buys into the plan at age 65, and other fractions that 
buy in when they are older. Each fraction is always adjusted by their corresponding 
probability of survival until their next birthday. In scenario 1 (diamonds), 50 
percent of the population buy in at age 65, and the remaining 50 percent are 
distributed evenly over the remaining buy-in years (which are determined by the 
LABA). For scenario 2 (circles), 25 percent buy in at age 65, and hence a 
remainder of 75 percent of the population is distributed over the remaining years, 
and for scenario 3 (squares), the ratio is 10 percent at 65 vs. 90 percent when older. 
Each dot represents a premium for the whole plan – and thus stands for a line 
parallel to the benchmark line – given the scenario and the LABA.  
To give an example for scenario 1 at age 66, 50 percent buy into a plan at age 65, 
and the survivors of the remaining 50 percent buy in at age 66. Similarly for scenario 2 
at age 75, 25 percent buy a policy at age 65, and for each age from 66 to 75, the 
survivors of 7.5 percent up to 75 years of age are added. For the first example, the 
actuarially fair premium for the whole plan population associated with this age 
distribution would be 1 percent higher than the benchmark premium. For the second 
example, the premium is around 7.2 percent higher than in the benchmark.  
The figure shows several important points with regard to the concern that 
premiums are distorted by people who do not buy in at age 65. First, note that with any 
shift of the age distribution to the right, i.e. with more older people in the plan 
population, the premium increases compared to the benchmark. Looking back at the 
formula for Community Rated plans in equation (2.2) in section 2.2., this can be  
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shown as well, as with an increase of people in age group a, the weight na/N is 
increased for the higher age groups, which have larger expected costs, Ea[C]. 
 Second, even for the extreme case of only 10 percent buying in at age 65, the 
maximum premium is not even 15 percent larger than the benchmark premium. Also, 
this maximum is at a LABY of 90 years, which is unlikely high, as insurance 
companies place restrictions on the buy-in age.  
Third, the scenarios presented here are somewhat unrealistic in the sense that the 
people buying are always distributed evenly over all age groups. One would expect 
more people to buy in at younger ages, i.e. rather between 65 and 75 than at 85 or 90 
years. Considering as well the fact that the costs for younger people are lower, the 
simulations show premiums that are likely to be an upper bound in the analysis of the 
impact of people buying plans at later ages. Thus the conclusion is that the premium 
distortion will not be large, if people are allowed to buy in when they are older than 
65, and premium variation larger than 15 percent is unlikely caused by differences in 
the buy-in age distribution.
18 
 
2.4.3.  Shocks To the Steady State Age Distribution 
So far, the focus was only on premiums for Community Rated plans when the age 
distribution remained in the steady state. However, in general shocks to the age 
distribution have to be considered as well – different reasons could lead to sudden 
increases in certain plan population fractions, for example through a competitor’s 
bankruptcy.
19 Again, an artificial scenario is created to consider an initial steady 
state population based on the predicted survival probabilities. Then this age 
                                                 
18 A different interpretation of this scenario would be to think of the older of people simply of less 
healthy people buying in at age 65. The conclusions would be the same – the people buying in extra are 
just in worse health and thus cause the premium increases. 
19 As mentioned in section 1.3.4., when Medigap coverage is lost not due to a covered person’s fault, 
she has the right to buy plan A, B, C, or F.   
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distribution is shocked by adding to the plan populations of a specific age group 
(or health group) sized at ten percent of the original population. 
Figure 2.4 shows three different populations that are added as a one-time event to 
a Community Rated plan after five years in the steady state. The solid line shows how 
the premium develops if a cohort (ten percent of the entire plan population) aged 70 
enters the plan. Again premiums are depicted relative to the initial (steady state) 
premium. At first the Community Rated premium drops, i.e. the entire plan population 
actually benefits from the entry, since the entering group is relatively young. When the 
entering cohort is relatively old (e.g. 80 years old, short-dashed line), there is an 
immediate increase in the premium, as the entrants have higher expected costs due to 
their age. Common to all scenarios is that at some point, the premium will be larger 
than the previous steady state premium, because at some point, the added population 
imposes extra cost on all individuals covered. However, the effect is dampened and 
disappears entirely after some time, depending on the age at entry.  
The increase in premium compared to the steady state at any point in time is not 
larger than 2.2 percent, for an entering group aged 80, and over those years in which 
an effect of the entry is observable, the sum of premiums (i.e. the area under the curve) 
increases by less than 1 percent compared to the steady state values. Allowing larger 
populations to enter increases these effects, but not dramatically: if the entering 
population is as large as 50 percent of the initial population, the maximum increase is 
about 9 percent, and the overall sum of premiums increases by 3.8 percent. This leads 
to the conclusion, that even large shocks to the age distribution of Community Rated 
plans should not lead to large distortions of premiums. 
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2.4.4.  Continuous Changes To The Steady State Age Distribution 
The next analysis reverts to the assumption that everybody is buying their policy at 
age 65, while the assumption of a steady state is relaxed. Instead, the actuarially 
fair premiums are simulated when the insurer’s age distribution mirrors the actual 
population distribution. For this the population projections from 2000-2100 are 
used, taken from the Census (Census Bureau, 2005b). Figure 2.5. shows the cost 
development for Community Rated plans for the years 2000 to 2100 in terms of the 
1999 premiums for men and women, using the predicted population distributions. 
(Appendix figures 2.1. and 2.2. show the respective age distributions for 2000, 
2020, 2050, and 2100.)  
The costs for both men and women move very characteristically relative to the 
1999 premium: they first rise from 2000 to 2006, and then start to decline, as the Baby 
Boomers start to enter the distribution, which causes a left shift in the age distribution. 
The costs are at a low for both genders at around 2022, where the mix of Baby 
Boomers and older people is at its optimum. Soon afterwards, however, as the Baby 
Boomers age, their costs push overall costs higher and higher, with an annual growth 
rate as high as 1.1 percent for women and 0.8 percent for men in 2038. Around 2050, 
the cohort of Baby Boomers perishes, which leads to a period of almost  steady costs 
for almost 10 years, followed by a constant increase in (real) expenses of about 0.2 
percent from 2065 onward, as the population becomes old and older every year. 
A look at the corresponding age distributions in the respective years shows that 
the distribution in 2020 indeed has a large mass of younger ages, whereas towards 
2050 and 2100, the distributions are more skewed towards older ages. This is best seen 
when looking at the fraction of people being 100 or older, which grows to be as large 
as the fraction of 65 year-olds. Figure 2.5. not only shows how costs (and premiums) 
could develop over the next 100 years, but again sheds light on 
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the differences in costs that insurance companies can experience due to differences 
in the age distribution.  
 
2.4.5.  Influences Of Health On Attained Age Premiums 
One further potential cause of differences in costs and thus premiums could be the 
type of people an insurer covers – one could imagine an insurer trying to advertise 
specifically in health clubs for the elderly, to attract a potentially healthier group. 
If successful, this insurer will be able to set lower actuarially fair premiums. While 
this will hold for all rating schemes, health differentials within an age group are 
the only way for Attained Age premiums to differ between two insurers that charge 
actuarially fair premiums. Any simulation in this case is somewhat arbitrary; 
however, in Figure 2.6. provides some insights by considering the possible effects 
of insuring individuals with different health.  
This figure shows the premiums for four different scenarios in relation to the 
original Attained Age premium depicted in Figure 2.1. Still the assumption holds 
that all individuals buy in at age 65, but now for individuals at age 65 are allowed 
to be of worse health, i.e. health that causes medical expenditures identical to the 
average costs of an older cohort. Variation in health status as well as variation in 
the fraction of people who are of worse health causes moderate effects: Even when 
half of the plan’s population has medical expenditures similar to a population of 80 
year olds, the plan’s premium is not more than 37 percent larger than the original 
premium. (The effects decrease with age, because not only are the expenditures 
those of older cohorts, but also the health status is worse and thus these individuals 
die earlier.) 
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2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates why actuarially fair premiums could vary in the Medigap 
market. The analysis is based on actual medical costs and abstracts from profit 
considerations of insurance companies. The impacts on premiums are investigated 
in several scenarios with respect to the rating methods used as well as to changes 
in the age distribution. The main finding is that substantial cost variation and thus 
premium variation can exist even when insurers charge actuarially fair premiums. 
The three different rating schemes – Attained Age, Issued Age, and Community 
Rating – can account for some of the premium variation an individual faces when 
buying a Medigap plan at a certain age. For example, for 65 year-old men, the costs of 
a Community Rated plan are simulated to be 47 percent higher than for an Attained 
Age plan. This is even assuming that all people buy into the Community Rated plan at 
age 65, hence it is somewhat surprising that this difference is larger than the mean 
ratio observed in the actual market, which is 28 percent (table 2.1.). One possible 
reason for this finding could be the dependency of coverage on age – the Community 
Rated premium presented here might be unnecessarily high due to coverage that is 
only affecting older buy-in ages and would not be included in the real plans. At a buy 
in age of 85, simulated Community Rated premiums are 20 percent less expensive 
than Attained Age plans; in the actual market, this differential is 27 percent. Since the 
rating methods are considered to be part of the definition of the homogenous good, 
variation in premiums due to rating methods is generally not considered to be a 
problem.  
However, the market also experiences price variation within the same rating 
scheme. Differences in age distributions between insurance companies can lead to 
substantial differences in costs and thus premiums. This variation in age distribution 
can realistically account for premium differentials of up to 40 percent (see Figure 2.5).   
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Of course other explanations (or a combination of them) are possible, especially 
since we observe larger variation in the Medigap market for Issued Age plans. These 
other explanation for cost and/or premium variation could include cost effectiveness, 
product differentiation, and the exertion of market power. The only reason why 
actuarially fair premiums could vary between Attained Age plans is that consumers’ 
health (and thus expected costs) differ by insurer.   
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2.6.  Appendix Tables And Figures 
 
Appendix Table 2.1.: Medical Care Expenditures by Gender (1992 - 2002) 
          
Age Male    Female    Age Male    Female 
65 3735.41  2508.78    86  11454.60  12756.69
66 4802.73  4840.19    87  10657.04  13180.77
67 5672.66  4979.07    88  12286.35  14619.33
68 5424.04  5538.68    89  13425.01  15718.84
69 5950.73  5680.89    90  12434.04  15750.63
70 6978.38  6462.05    91  16035.47  16193.22
71 6658.55  6206.37    92  13673.42  17610.81
72 7715.60  6647.82    93  13578.39  17467.20
73 7710.38  6889.65    94  15281.84  19837.04
74 7381.41  7018.21    95  18332.33  19289.13
75 7606.55  7081.85    96  14523.58  21654.45
76 8056.81  7423.00    97  15480.58  19978.91
77 8458.76  7928.53    98  20480.19  20811.45
78 8681.60  8792.67    99  16968.24  22039.24
79 8800.88  8559.21    100  17198.50  20690.43
80 10008.90 8782.60         
81 9942.89  9271.74         
82 9953.88  9976.08         
83 10304.19 10990.34         
84 10325.54 11402.92         
85 11707.65 11817.87         
           
 
Notes: 
All values in year 2000 dollars using the medical care Consumer Price Index, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, 2005. Figures are weighted means of total medical expenditures. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using MCBS 1992-2002.  
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Appendix Table 2.2.: Results from Expenditure Regression: 
ln(real expenses)= β0 + β1*age 
    
  Male Female 
Constant  0.0403 0.0522 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Age  6.0665 5.131 
 
(0.009) (0.006) 
    
Observations  47014 68692 
R
2  0.7245 0.8642 
 
Notes: 
Weighted Regression with real expenses. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Author’s calculations using MCBS 1992-2002. 
    
    
Appendix Table 2.3.: Results from Regression On Death Rates: 
ln(probability of death)= γ 0 + γ 1*age 
    
  Male Female 
Constant  0.0881 0.1028 
 
(0.0015)  (0.0026) 
Age  -9.6242 -11.231 
 
(0.126) (0.218) 
    
Observations  306 301 
R
2  0.9154 0.8340 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Author’s calculations using Census’ intercensal estimates 1990-
1999 
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Appendix Table 2.4: Fractions of Simulated Age Distribution 65-100+ 
        
Age  Male Female    Age  Male Female 
  65  0.0609 0.0500      86  0.0179 0.0232 
  66  0.0597 0.0495      87  0.0156 0.0210 
  67  0.0584 0.0489      88  0.0134 0.0189 
  68  0.0570 0.0483      89  0.0114 0.0168 
  69  0.0555 0.0476      90  0.0095 0.0147 
  70  0.0539 0.0468      91  0.0077 0.0126 
  71  0.0522 0.0460      92  0.0062 0.0107 
  72  0.0504 0.0451      93  0.0048 0.0089 
  73  0.0485 0.0441      94  0.0037 0.0072 
  74  0.0465 0.0431      95  0.0027 0.0057 
  75  0.0444 0.0419      96  0.0019 0.0044 
  76  0.0422 0.0407      97  0.0013 0.0032 
  77  0.0400 0.0393      98  0.0009 0.0023 
  78  0.0377 0.0379      99  0.0006 0.0016 
  79  0.0353 0.0364   100+  0.0007 0.0024 
  80  0.0328 0.0347       
  81  0.0303 0.0330       
  82  0.0278 0.0312       
  83  0.0253 0.0293       
  84  0.0228 0.0273       
  85  0.0203 0.0253       
 
Notes: 
Source: Author’s calculations using Census’ intercensal estimates 1990-1999.  
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Appendix Figure 2.1: Selected Age Distributions for Men  
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3.CHAPTER THREE 
PRICING OF COVERAGE PACKAGES AND COMPETITION 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with important aspects of the premium variation in the 
Medigap market. Using pricing regressions, I determine the marginal impact of 
different coverage packages on insurance premiums. While this approach provides 
key insights about how different degrees of coverage are priced by the insurance 
firms, it does not address the issue of variation within each plan. This aspect is the 
focus of the second part of the analysis, where I determine the influence of state 
and firm specific variables on homogenous products. I argue that this may also 
serve as a measurement for the degree of competition in the market. 
This analysis has some relevance for policy makers. For example, the pricing 
model allows to price specific parts of insurance policies for the elderly. As mentioned 
before, insurance companies could offer prescription drug coverage in three Medigap 
plans until in January of 2006, when Medicare part D for prescription drug coverage 
was introduced. Although this is not part of this analysis, the results from the pricing 
regressions presented here may serve as a benchmark to evaluate the price setting 
decisions of firms offering the new plans for Medicare part D. In addition, the 
dynamic development of the market is important to evaluate the impacts of OBRA90 – 
did the price variation decrease and did competition increase over time? This also 
sheds some light on how the market might develop in the future. 
The analyses lead to the conclusion, that the Medigap market experienced a slight 
expansion from 1998 to 2000, but contracted dramatically towards 2002. There are 
indications that this led to an increase in the competition in the market, as over time,  
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firm specific effects lose influence, mark-ups for specific coverage packages decrease 
and state specific influences increase.  
The next section briefly illustrates how the Weiss data are used in this chapter, 
and what data are used to augment the analysis. Section 3.3. will show detailed sample 
means to provide a thorough description of the market and its developments. In 
section 3.4., I present the econometric setup, whereas section 3.5. will show the 
results. Section 3.6. summarizes the findings and concludes. 
 
3.2. Data  Specifications 
The main data source used in this chapter is the premium data provided by Weiss 
Ratings, Inc. Here, data from 1998 to 2002 are used. From the plan letters A 
through J (see Table 1.1.) I code indicators of what specific benefit is covered to 
elicit the influence of that benefit on the price. Since all plans have to cover 
Medicare part A and B coinsurance as well as the costs for three pints of blood per 
year, these cannot be part of the indicators; instead these costs will be reflected in 
the regression constant. Then there remain the following indicators for the 
coverage of: i) Medicare part A deductible, ii) Medicare part B deductible, iii) 
Medicare part B excess charges, iv) at home recovery costs, v) prescription drugs 
(basic), vi) prescription drugs (extended), and vii) preventive services that are 
covered by Medicare. Note that the latter six indicators all include the coverage of 
skilled nursing facilities (SNF) as well as foreign travel coverage, such that these 
effects cannot be separated out in the price regression.  
The Weiss data are augmented by data from the Area Resource File (ARF) of 
2004. This dataset contains various variables of interest on a county level. I will use 
this information mainly to account for state differences that might lead to differences 
in pricing the Medigap policy. The Medicare Adjusted Average per Capita Cost  
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(administered by the CMS for each county) are used by Medicare HMOs to estimate 
the costs for an average Medicare beneficiary. While these costs are averages for the 
whole county, they can be further adjusted by age, gender, and Medicare status 
(employed, institutionalized, Medicaid, non-Medicaid). In this analysis, they serve as a 
proxy for county health in the specific age-gender subgroup of the non-Medicaid 
Medicare beneficiaries.
20 Medicare inpatient days per Medicare recipient are another 
way to measure the health of the Medicare population. An important factor is the 
degree of Medicare Managed Care penetration in the county, as this poses a significant 
competition to the Medigap policies. Robst (2001) argues that a higher level of 
Medicare Managed Care should lead to increases in price, since the healthier 
individuals would rather go into HMOs than into regular plans. Another important 
aspect of competition is how many firms operate with the same policy in one state.
21 
While the assumption of a fully competitive market may not hold because of lack of 
information on the buyers’ side (see also Chapter Four), still an increase in the number 
of firms in a market should increase competition between firms and thus should lower 
prices. The per capita income are added since it has been shown that individuals with 
more income are more likely to buy into Medigap (e.g. Wolfe and Goddeeris, 1991, or 
Fang et al., 2006). Finally the unemployment rate is used to control for general 
economic developments specific to the county.
22  
As section 1.5. showed, premium variation within a firm across counties is rather 
small. Hence I aggregate both data sources to a state level, where, similar to Robst 
                                                 
20 The main advantage of this variable is its target on the specific age group under investigation here, 
i.e. the Medicare population. Other cost indicators, e.g. the state’s physician and hospital wage 
expenditure, had less explanatory power in test regressions and thus are not used in the analyses.  
21 The “same policy” is defined as in section 1.5.1.: an identical policy in terms of plan letter, plan type, 
gender, age group, and rating method. 
22 The unemployment rate may also be interpreted as a proxy for how much competition the Medigap 
market faces through employer provided supplemental insurance. In counties with low unemployment, 
more individuals should be covered by their former employers. Since there is no assumption as to 
whether these people would be healthier or not, the direction of this effect is not clear.   
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(2001), the county observations are weighted by the number of Medicare 
beneficiaries (taken from the ARF files) in the respective county.
23  
 
3.3. Sample  Means 
3.3.1.  General Premium Differences 
Table 3.1. shows the mean premiums over the years in the complete sample as well 
as split by gender and age group.
24 The premiums are inflation-adjusted to year 
2000 dollars by the medical care consumer price index (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2006). From the first category (“Totals”), three stylized facts can be observed, that 
remain true for all categories in the table. First, the mean premiums increase over 
the years, on average by three percent. However, the growth is not steady over 
increases from 1998 to 1999, slightly drops towards 2000, only to then 
dramatically drop in 2001 (by about twenty percent). From 2001 to 2002, the 
number of offers remains almost constant. These three facts suggest, that the 
Medigap market underwent some structural changes between 1998 and 2002. 
While fewer firms were operating in the market from 2001 on and the variation in 
policy premiums declined at that time, only in 2002 was this reflected in a smaller 
increase in premium levels.  
The differences between offers for men and women are relatively small: on 
average, men pay $18 (or 1.2 percent) more than women.
25 The premiums for men 
rose about one percentage point more in the five-year period than that for women, 
leading to a slightly larger spread in 2002. The number of offers for men and women
                                                 
23 To compare the impact of the level of aggregation, I also conducted the analysis in section 3.4. using 
county level information from Weiss and ARF data. There are few differences of statistical significance 
between the specifications, but none of them is leading to qualitatively different results.  
24 Note that I am only considering age 65, 75, and 85, although all age groups from 65 to 100 years are 
included in the Weiss data. 
25 Almost all differences in premiums between any two groups in Table 3.1. and in the following tables 
are significant at a ten percent level at least, in most cases at a one percent level.   
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Table 3.1.: Sample Premium Means and Standard Deviations 
       
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Totals  1435 1480 1530 1577 1614 
 
(707) (724) (921) (732) (627) 
Sample  Size  57516 63460 61020 48522 48872 
       
Male  1441 1489 1536 1587 1627 
 
(710) (726) (920) (732) (629) 
Sample  Size  28758 31730 30510 24261 24436 
Female  1429 1470 1524 1567 1601 
 
(705) (722) (921) (732) (626) 
Sample  Size  28758 31730 30510 24261 24436 
Age 65  1122 1147 1189 1237 1278 
 
(510) (517) (657) (537) (451) 
Sample  Size  19462 21316 20500 16210 16378 
Age 75  1486 1530 1569 1609 1648 
 
(679) (700) (883) (670) (562) 
Sample  Size  19462 21316 20500 16212 16378 
Age 85  1710 1769 1839 1888 1921 
 
(782)  (790) (1062) (812)  (675) 
Sample  Size  18592 20828 20020 16100 16116 
 
Notes: 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. All values are inflation-adjusted by the medical 
care Consumer Price Index, reflecting year 2000 dollars. See text for further details. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss Data 1998-2002. 
       
       
time: While in the first three years the increase in premiums is larger than three 
percent, from 2001 to 2002 it is only 2.3 percent. Second, the variation in 
premiums as measured by the standard deviation peaks in 2000, then drops towards 
2002 to levels below those of 1998. Third, the number of policy offers first is  
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identical, whereas the standard deviation for women is in general slightly lower. 
Similar to observations in chapter two, there are large premium differences 
between the age groups: 65 year-olds pay on average $374 less than 75 year-olds 
and $631 less than 85 year-olds, which reflects the increasing medial costs with 
age. The variation in premiums for 75 (85) year-olds is 30 percent (54 percent) 
higher than that of 65 year-olds. This shows, that the older groups not only face 
higher premium levels but also a larger spread in these premiums, even though the 
number of offers is not very different between the age groups. All age groups 
experience a reduction in spread from 2000 onwards, but it is more pronounced in 
the higher age groups, which may be a first indication, that competition increased 
over time in those market segments. 
 
3.3.2.  Distribution of Policy Characteristics 
Table 3.2. restricts the sample to offers made to 65 year-old men. The table gives 
an overview of how the different plan characteristics are distributed across these 
offers and how their fractions develop over time. Most offers are standard plans, 
although in the course from 1998 to 2002, their fraction is reduced by almost 20 
percentage points. At the same time, the fraction of plans offered to smokers 
dramatically increased from seven to over twenty percent. The fraction of select 
plans, which reduce the flexibility of medical service, is small and relatively 
constant at between four and seven percent. From the number of observations in 
the bottom row it is apparent that the market contracted by more than twenty 
percent from 1999 to 2001. Mainly this is due a reduction in the number of 
standard plans, whereas the number of smoking plans remains almost constant over 
time.  
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Table 3.2.: Sample Means of Weiss Data Variables 
       
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Plan Type       
   Standard   0.889  0.833  0.770  0.688  0.690 
 
(0.315) (0.373) (0.421) (0.463) (0.462) 
   Smoker  0.070  0.117  0.171  0.261  0.245 
 
(0.255) (0.321) (0.377) (0.439) (0.430) 
   Select  0.041  0.050  0.059  0.051  0.065 
 
(0.199) (0.218) (0.236) (0.220) (0.246) 
Weiss Rating A  0.126  0.135  0.116  0.175  0.175 
 
(0.332) (0.342) (0.320) (0.380) (0.380) 
Weiss Rating B  0.366  0.333  0.269  0.266  0.260 
 
(0.482) (0.471) (0.443) (0.442) (0.439) 
Weiss Rating C  0.165  0.186  0.238  0.294  0.295 
 
(0.371) (0.389) (0.426) (0.456) (0.456) 
Weiss Rating D  0.246  0.255  0.303  0.262  0.253 
 
(0.431) (0.436) (0.459) (0.440) (0.435) 
Not  Rated  0.097 0.091 0.075 0.002 0.017 
 
(0.296) (0.287) (0.263) (0.040) (0.130) 
Rating Method       
   Attained Age   0.634  0.690  0.686  0.683  0.669 
 
(0.482) (0.462) (0.464) (0.465) (0.470) 
   Issued Age   0.289  0.236  0.241  0.246  0.259 
 
(0.453) (0.425) (0.428) (0.430) (0.438) 
   Community Rating   0.077  0.073  0.074  0.071  0.071 
 
(0.266) (0.260) (0.261) (0.257) (0.258) 
Observations  9731 10658  10250 8105  8189 
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Table 3.2.: (continued) 
       
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Plans covering:       
0.188 0.184 0.187 0.194 0.191     Basic Coverage 
      only  (0.390) (0.387) (0.390) (0.396) (0.393) 
0.812 0.816 0.813 0.806 0.809     Medicare part A 
      deductible  (0.390) (0.387) (0.390) (0.396) (0.393) 
0.385 0.384 0.389 0.410 0.397     Medicare part B 
      deductible  (0.487) (0.486) (0.488) (0.492) (0.489) 
0.259 0.264 0.249 0.242 0.250     at home recovery 
      costs  (0.438) (0.441) (0.432) (0.428) (0.433) 
0.081 0.072 0.061 0.053 0.041     preventive services 
  (0.273) (0.259) (0.240) (0.224) (0.199) 
0.346 0.338 0.326 0.323 0.322     Medicare part B 
      excess charges  (0.476) (0.473) (0.469) (0.468) (0.467) 
0.088 0.079 0.069 0.043 0.038     prescription drugs 
      (basic)  (0.283) (0.269) (0.254) (0.204) (0.192) 
0.039 0.032 0.025 0.026 0.015     prescription drugs 
      (extended)  (0.194) (0.176) (0.156) (0.159) (0.123) 
Observations  9731 10658  10250 8105  8189 
 
Notes: 
Sample is restricted to offers made to 65 year-old males. An observation is a plan offer made 
by any firm within a state to this group. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss Data 1998-2002. 
       
       
The Weiss Rating measures the financial stability of firms in the Medigap market, 
where “A” is “excellent”, “B” is “good”, “C” is “fair”, “D” is “weak”, and “E” and 
“F” are “very weak” and “failed”, respectively. A number of firms do not receive 
any rating, because they are too small or Weiss does not have enough  
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information.
26 The ratings do not vary by firm over the years, i.e. there are no firms 
that receive a certain rating in one year and a different rating in another. Hence 
shifts in the fractions for the rating groups in Table 3.2. can be interpreted as shifts 
in the number of offers put forward by each rating group. The percentage of offers 
by firms receiving a “B” rating decreases by ten percent, whereas firms rated A or 
C increased their share over the years by five and thirteen percent, respectively. 
Firms with D ratings or lower have a surprisingly large share overall, peaking at 30 
percent in 2000 and then dropping by to 25 percent in 2002. In light of the 
previous observations that indicated a contraction of the market, this can be 
expected: competition will drive the weakest firms out of the market first. A 
similar explanation may hold for the large decline from 2000 to 2001 in the 
fraction of those firms that are not rated by Weiss, since these are the small firms 
in particular.  
The three rating methods show little dynamics with respect to their market share 
over the years, with two thirds of all offers to 65 year-old men being of Attained Age 
rating, 25 percent of Issued Age, and only 7.3 percent with Community Rating. 
The fractions of the different coverage packages in the next eight rows are not 
mutually exclusive, i.e. these are not the plans from Table 1.1., but rather their 
different policy benefits and how common they are among the offers. About nineteen 
percent of all plans do not offer any benefits other than the mandatory coverage 
specified by plan A. Roughly 81 percent of all plans offer the Medicare Part A 
deductible, between 38-41 percent offer the part B deductible as well. Also relatively 
common coverage is at home recovery (25 percent) as well as part B excess charges 
                                                 
26 Weiss Ratings Inc., 2005: “The company is unrated for one or more of the following reasons: 1) total 
assets are less than $1 million; 2) premium income for the current year is less than $100,000; 3) the 
company functions almost exclusively as a holding company rather than as an underwriter; or 4) we do 
not have enough information to reliably issue a rating.”  
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(32-35 percent). Few plans offer preventive services or prescription drug coverage, 
and both categories experience a decline in prevalence over the years: while the 
fraction of plans with preventive services drops from eight to less than four percent, 
offers for prescription drugs coverage (basic and extended) decline from thirteen to 
five percent from 1998 to 2002. These declines do not follow the pattern observed 
earlier (i.e. peaking in 2000), but instead are spread out relatively even across the 
years. Parts of this decrease in offers may be explained by the general increase in the 
prescription drug expenditures over time, where the out of pocket expenditures have 
almost doubled from 2000 to 2005 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005). Increasing per 
person expenditures combined with a fixed deductible of $250 make these plans a 
financial liability to insurance companies. They have to charge higher prices to cover 
the increasing financial risks, which then leads to a reduction in demand, and 
successively, in supply. 
 
3.3.3.  Premium Means for Policy Characteristics 
While Table 3.2. shows the fractions of plans in different categories, it is also 
interesting to look at the premiums associated with these categories. Table 3.3. 
allows to investigate whether the first two stylized facts from Table 3.1., i.e. the 
increase in premium levels over the years and the decrease in premium variation 
from 2000 onwards, are present in different categories as well. (The third fact, the 
pattern of the reduction in the number of offers, is presented in the last row of 
Table 3.3.) Again, the focus is on policy offers to 65 year-old men.  
The first three rows focus on the three different plan types, “standard”, “smoker” 
and “select”. The first stylized fact of increasing premiums is also reflected by the 
three plan types, although to different degrees: while the standard plans experience a 
premium increase of 3.2 percent per year and thus follow similar trends as found in  
  63
Table 3.3.: Average Premiums by Plan Characteristics 
       
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Plan Type       
   Standard   1154  1189  1231  1263  1309 
 
(526) (544) (704) (573) (481) 
   Smoker  813  848  868  979  1023 
 
(222) (237) (240) (298) (292) 
   Select  964  1038  1141  1249  1295 
 
(306) (299) (468) (449) (366) 
Weiss Rating A  1086  1123  1168  1289  1263 
 
(549) (559) (650) (658) (311) 
Weiss Rating B  1175  1208  1174  1252  1303 
 
(521) (549) (490) (478) (467) 
Weiss Rating C  1020  1095  1169  1244  1283 
 
(354) (409) (536) (581) (483) 
Weiss Rating D  1162  1140  1248  1206  1290 
 
(558) (507) (861) (435) (474) 
Not  Rated  1085 1164 1170 1569 1338 
 
(487) (535) (556) (421) (441) 
Rating Method       
   Attained Age   1045  1080  1116  1157  1217 
 
(441) (457) (632) (440) (393) 
   Issued Age   1227  1266  1317  1402  1415 
 
(542) (537) (599) (671) (501) 
   Community Rating   1422  1486  1523  1543  1486 
 
(709) (738) (857) (611) (575) 
Observations  9731 10658  10250 8105  8189 
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Table 3.3.: (continued) 
       
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Plans covering:       
658 697 729 810 892     Basic Coverage 
      only  (155) (173) (185) (205) (228) 
1235 1257 1301 1349 1381     Medicare part A 
      deductible  (503) (513) (678) (538) (439) 
1321 1338 1349 1457 1478     Medicare part B 
      deductible  (527) (518) (538) (594) (416) 
1432 1422 1464 1478 1398     at home recovery 
      costs  (709) (713) (921) (790) (537) 
1739 1746 1782 2077 1661     preventive services 
  (922)  (934) (1088)  (1284) (818) 
1453 1464 1502 1535 1512     Medicare part B 
      excess charges  (600) (616) (793) (679) (488) 
1814 1928 2399 2060 2070     prescription drugs 
      (basic)  (559) (652)  (1376)  (665) (768) 
2524 2622 2885 3153 2521     prescription drugs 
      (extended)  (711) (703) (885)  (1035)  (718) 
Observations  9731 10658  10250 8105  8189 
 
Notes: 
Sample is restricted to offers made to 65 year-old males. An observation is a plan offer made 
by any firm within a state to this group. All values are inflation-adjusted by the medical care 
Consumer Price Index, reflecting year 2000 dollars. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss Data 1998-2002. 
       
       
Table 3.1., plans for smokers and select plans incur much larger average increases 
in premiums of 5.9 and 7.7 percent per year, respectively. Moreover, the smoker 
plans experience a one-time increase in 2000 of almost thirteen percent. Due to the 
faster premium growth of select plans, the gap in premiums between select and  
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standard plans closes over time, such that in 2002, the differential is only $14 on 
average. The somewhat surprisingly negative (but decreasing) difference in 
premiums between standard and smoker plans (about $323 less on average) can be 
explained by the fact that there are virtually no prescription drug plans for 
smokers. Since the averages are taken over all offers of a certain plan type, these 
systematic difference are not taken into account here. The second stylized fact of a 
reduction in variation from 2000 to 2002 is more pronounced for the standard and 
select plans, whereas the variation in smoker plans actually increases. This might 
be due to the fact that the previously mentioned decrease in plans mainly affected 
select and standard plans, while the number of smoker plans remained almost 
constant.  
Over all years, the premiums associated with the different financial ratings 
experience increases between eleven percent (B and D rating) and twenty-six percent 
(C rating). This is not a constant growth, however, but all five rating categories 
(except for the C rating) experience a decline in premium means at some point over 
the five years. There is no consistent pattern for the premium variation, although all 
five categories have a smaller variation in 2002 compared to 2000. The differences in 
premium averages between the categories are not consistently different from one 
another.  
The Attained Age offers to 65 year-old men are the lowest among the different 
rating methods for all years, on average $203 and $369 less than Issued Age and 
Community Rated plans, respectively. Both Issued Age and Attained Age offers 
follow a similar premium and variation pattern as the premiums found in Table 3.1. 
However, Community Rated plans experience less growth, and even a drop of 3.7 
percent in average premiums from 2001 to 2002.  
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The premium means for the different coverage packages show some interesting 
patterns that are diverging from the stylized facts in Table 3.1. The premiums for basic 
plans have a much larger increase (almost eight percent per year) than any other 
category when averaging over all years. This is matched by a general increase in 
variation of plan A premiums over this period. The basic plan covers part A 
coinsurance, part A hospital benefits, the part B coinsurance, and the costs for three 
pints of blood (see Table 1.1.). As the rates for the first three parts are fixed federally, 
their development can be related to the premiums here. From 1998 to 2002, the federal 
rates have decreased in real terms by almost nine percent (own calculations using 
Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005). Hence the finding of increasing premiums for basic 
coverage, although unconditional, is surprising and suggests that premiums are not 
based solely on the federal costs.
27  
Those plans covering the Medicare part A deductible follow the general pattern in 
Table 3.1., i.e. an increase in the average of twelve percent from 1998 to 2002, with a 
larger growth before 2001. Also the variation pattern looks similar, i.e. the standard 
deviation is reduced towards 2002. While premiums for coverage packages covering 
the part B deductible grow at about twelve percent over all years, they experience an 
unusual growth of eight percent in 2000. For at home recovery and part B excess 
charge coverage, the premiums remain almost constant and even drop from 2001 to 
2002. The most dramatic changes occur for the coverage of preventive services and 
prescription drugs, which both experience premium drops of twenty percent from 
2001 to 2002. In addition, those plans offering basic drug coverage decrease their 
premiums from 2000 to 2001 by about fourteen percent. It is interesting that these 
dramatic reductions are occurring only once over the five year period, and are 
                                                 
27 The costs of three pints of blood is unlikely to have offset the decrease in costs of part A coinsurance, 
part A hospital benefits, and the part B coinsurance.  
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seemingly not related to the constant decline in offers for these plans seen in Table 
3.2. However, the decrease in premium spread over time present in most categories 
can be interpreted as an increase in competition.  
 
3.3.4.  Premium Means for State Characteristics 
Table 3.4. depicts average premiums split by some of the buyer’s characteristics, 
i.e. the ARF variables. The premiums are for 65 year-old men buying standard plan 
A, which is the plan offering only the basic coverage (see Table 1.1.). For each of 
the ARF variables, I calculate the 25
th and 75
th percentile (in a year-plan-gender-
age group), and then report the premium averages for the states in the lower and 
upper quartile as well as in the interquartile range of this variable.  
While Table 3.4. contains a wide range of information, I focus only on the 
premium differences between the quartiles to show that the state variation might 
contribute to premium variation. Several variables show variation in the premiums 
based on the quartile: States in the lower quartile of the Medicare adjusted per capita 
cost have premiums that are on average sixteen percent lower than those states in the 
upper quartile. For Medicare inpatient days, it is somewhat strange that the premiums 
in the interquartile range are lower than both the upper and lower quartile, especially 
since there is no consistent relationship between the lower and upper quartile. States 
with a high degree of Managed Medicare penetration have larger average premiums 
(on average fifteen percent), concurring with Robst’s (2001) assessment. Markets with 
fewer firms have higher premiums, which could indicate that in those markets the lack 
of competition allows the firms to charge higher prices. The difference peaks at $60 in 
2000, and declines to $26 in 2002 (both significant) thus this finding strengthens the 
notion of a general contraction in the Medigap market towards 2002. States in the 
upper quartile of per capita income have slightly higher (4.3 percent on average)  
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Table 3.4.: Average Premiums by Area Resource File Variables 
       
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
       
Medicare Pay Rate, Male, 65       
below  25th  Percentile  622 655 682 754 841 
 
(138) (151) (166) (183) (222) 
25th  to  75th  Percentile  652 679 709 769 856 
 
(147) (156) (165) (166) (196) 
above  75th  Percentile  728 763 802 881 958 
 
(181) (196) (215) (228) (233) 
       
Medicare Inpatient Days per Beneficiary 
below  25th  Percentile  689 723 743 786 888 
 
(181) (191) (203) (196) (236) 
25th  to  75th  Percentile  646 675 706 785 858 
 
(148) (163) (177) (198) (211) 
above  75th  Percentile  669 701 738 807 898 
 
(146) (159) (168) (179) (206) 
       
Managed Medicare Penetration        
below  25th  Percentile  650 648 660 719 810 
 
(148) (141) (144) (164) (197) 
25th  to  75th  Percentile  647 691 738 798 887 
 
(148) (166) (179) (179) (220) 
above  75th  Percentile  706 744 771 855 927 
 
(179) (193) (213) (221) (214) 
       
Observations  1621 1629 1486 1107 1107 
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Table 3.4.: (continued) 
       
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
       
Number of Firms Offering the Same Policy 
below  25th  Percentile  685 716 762 822 884 
 
(157) (183) (182) (191) (225) 
25th  to  75th  Percentile  660 694 723 790 885 
 
(161) (174) (191) (203) (223) 
above  75th  Percentile  649 678 702 773 858 
 
(150) (151) (164) (179) (202) 
       
Per Capita Income 
below  25th  Percentile  658 695 722 794 891 
 
(151) (159) (173) (189) (225) 
25th  to  75th  Percentile  645 672 704 767 861 
 
(145) (158) (168) (177) (215) 
above  75th  Percentile  700 732 760 831 889 
 
(182) (197) (213) (217) (212) 
       
Unemployment Rate        
below  25th  Percentile  609 635 672 716 815 
 
(129) (147) (167) (178) (201) 
25th  to  75th  Percentile  682 715 744 820 891 
 
(167) (174) (186) (191) (222) 
above  75th  Percentile  676 713 740 811 917 
 
(153) (173) (184) (192) (210) 
       
Observations  1621 1629 1486 1107 1107 
       
 
Notes: 
Sample restricted to standard plan A offers made to 65 year-old males. An observation is a 
plan offer made by any firm within a state to this group. All values are inflation-adjusted by 
the medical care Consumer Price Index, reflecting year 2000 dollars. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss data 1998-2002 and ARF 2004.  
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premiums than those in the lower quartile, and states with unemployment rates in 
the upper quartile have premiums that are on average twelve percent higher. 
Tables 3.2., 3.3., and 3.4. show some interesting differences in premium averages, 
although it is important to note that they are all unconditional, and the “true” influence 
might change in the following multivariate analysis. Especially interesting is whether 
the contraction of the market in 2002 can be shown to have effects on premiums. 
 
3.4. Econometric  Methods 
3.4.1.  Marginal Impacts On Price  
The variation in prices over firms and states will help to specify the influence of 
different variable groups on price, i.e. plan characteristics (coverage of different 
conditions), firm characteristics (Weiss financial ratings), buyer characteristics 
(state level variables), and market characteristics (rating methods, number of 
competitors).
28 The analysis will also investigate whether time trends are present in 
the variables, which might indicate future developments of the market.  
Specifically, an insurance policy i in year t is any firm j’s insurance offer in a 
state s; distinguished by the plan letter, the rating method, and the age group; whether 
it is offered to men or women; and whether it is a standard, select or a smoker plan. 
Each of the policies is associated with a number of firm specific characteristics, Xj, 
which are fixed across the policies a firm offers in different states and in different 
years. Each of the policies has certain coverage characteristics, Pi, which are identical 
across firms, states, and years. Within each state, all policies face the same buyer 
characteristics, Bs, and hence the state specific variables do not vary by policy or firm 
                                                 
28 To some extent, this method is similar to that of a hedonic price regression, see for example Rosen 
(1974) or Lucas (1977). However, since demand for the Medigap policies is not a part of this analysis, 
the coefficients do not reflect the consumers’ average marginal willingness to pay for specific product 
characteristics, but rather the firms’ “marginal willingness to charge”.  
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within a state, but by year only. Then the basic equation to determine the influence on 
a premium yijst (charged for policy i by firm j in state s and year t) is: 
 (3.1)   ijst j P st P i X j ijst B P X y ε η β β β β + + + + + = 0 ) ln(  
Variables used in Pi are the coverage and rating indicators as well as the indicators 
for standard, select and smoker plans. Bst contains the Medicare adjusted costs, the 
percent of Managed Medicare penetration, the per capita income, and the 
unemployment rate.
29 As a measure for competitive influence on prices, I include 
in Bst the number of firms offering the same policy in a state as a variable as well. 
Xj and ηj are firm specific effects, where the Xj are the Weiss financial ratings and 
ηj depict unobserved heterogeneity in firms. 
An OLS estimation of the different β’s is consistent, as long as the unobserved  
effects are not correlated with any of the observed variables. While this seems to be a 
reasonable assumption for the state specific variables Bst, there is some concern about 
Xj and especially Pi: the offers of specific coverage packages observed in the market 
are based on a firm’s perception of how to perform best in the market. Since these 
perceptions remain unobserved, they could influence Pi in a non-random way, hence 
introducing omitted variable bias. Since a Hausman test for random vs. fixed effects 
leads to a rejection of the random effects model, the β’s are estimated by age groups 
and gender separately for each year (1998-2002) with regressions employing a fixed 
effects procedure. The firm specific variables in Xj (which are the Weiss Ratings) drop 
out of the equation.
30 The error terms εijst are allowed to be correlated for any number 
                                                 
29 I am not using the number of Medicare inpatient days, since they can be assumed to measure the 
health of individuals in the states, similar to the Medicare adjusted costs. Indeed the variables are 
correlated and results run with Medicare inpatient days or the hospital expenditures do not change 
qualitatively.   
30 The fixed effects could also be specified with state-firm interactions. This however does not lead to 
different results, but leads to losing the state specific variables in the regression as well.   
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of offers by a firm within a state, i.e. on a state-firm level. Identification of the β’s is 
obtained through variation of firms across states and across policies offered.  
One important aspect of the analysis is the measure of competition. A measure of 
concentration like the Herfindahl-Index is in general preferred in the literature, but 
since there are no demand data specific enough to capture the populations within a 
homogenous product group (i.e. a state, plan letter, plan type, gender,  age, and rating 
method cell), this variable cannot be created. Tests with Herfindahl-Indexes defined 
on a state – plan letter or a state basis only did not yield significant results, which is 
likely due to the lack of precision in defining the index. Thus the rather crude measure 
of firms per market is used here, and the development in the coefficients over time is 
specifically interpreted in their relation to market competition.  
 
3.4.2.  Firm Specific vs. State Specific Variation  
General economic theory suggests, that a market for homogenous goods that 
experiences variation in prices cannot be fully competitive (see for example 
Stiglitz, 1989). In the Medigap market, after controlling for plan letter, plan type, 
rating method, gender, and age, one would expect the remaining variation to be 
explained by state specific effects, if the market was competitive. That is, 
including controls for states (e.g. state fixed effects) should eliminate most of the 
variation, the remainder would be due to omitted non-linear effects. If there is a 
lack of competition, at least part of the variation will be explained by firm specific 
variables.  
In the following two-step procedure, I use this relationship. First, I restrict the 
analysis to specific age and gender groups and construct a set of interacted indicators 
for any plan letter, plan type, and rating method combination. This creates at most 90 
indicators within any age-gender group. The residuals from a regression of the  
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premiums on these indicators are then regressed separately in a second stage on both 
state (at most 48) and firm fixed effects (at most 147). The degree of residual variation 
that is explained by state and firm effects, respectively, will serve as a measure of 
competition in the market.
31 As an alternative method of this analysis, I will fully 
interact state indicators with each plan letter, plan type, and rating method, creating 
overall 1852 dummy variables.
32 Then again, the residuals of a regression on these 
indicators are regressed on the firm effects, where the degree of variation can be 
interpreted similarly as before.  
This approach, while not a standard to measure competition, seems particularly 
attractive in this setting, where data that are usually used to measure competition, i.e. 
demand variables, are not available. The comparison of the explanatory power of state 
vs. firm fixed effects allows to determine the importance of each type of indicator. In 
addition, the dynamics of the explained variation over time show market 
developments, i.e. an increase in the explanatory power of firm effects can be 
interpreted as a decrease in the degree of competition. 
 
3.5. Results 
The discussion of the regression results form the price regressions is organized as 
follows: first the results for insurance policies offered to 65 year-old men are 
discussed. With these results as a benchmark, I will compare them with the results 
for women as well as for 75 and 85 year-old men. In those discussions I will refer 
to the relevant results only.  
                                                 
31 Note that since the interest is solely on the degree of variation that is explained by the effects, no 
“real” variables are included. While the coefficients do not have any interpretation except for being a 
mean shifter for the specific state or firm, this approach provides maximum flexibility.  
32 Note that the maximum possible number here would be 3 (rating method) times 3 (plan types) times 
10 (plan letters) times 48 (states) equaling 4320 indicators. However, not all combinations of plans exist 
in all states, hence this number is smaller than the maximum.   
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Since the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of premiums, the estimated 
coefficients (β’s from equation 3.1) can be interpreted as percentage shifts in 
premiums caused by an increase in the corresponding independent variable. 
Accordingly, the difference between any two coefficients translates into a percentage 
difference in the dollar amount of premiums.  
Comparing the coefficients over the years allows some conclusions about the 
market structure: In a competitive market, one would expect little changes in the 
influence of variables, unless exogenous shocks change the structure of the market. 
For example, in a competitive market for health insurance, the influence of average 
health in a state should not affect the premiums differently across years. (If there are 
changes in health, these should be reflected in changes in premiums, not in the 
influence of health on premiums.) I am not aware of any exogenous changes to the 
Medigap market (either state or policy specific) that occurred during the period under 
investigation here, and hence I interpret significant changes over time in the 
coefficients as evidence for a lack of competition. The direction of the change is also 
important, and the interpretation depends on the type of variable: if the influence for a 
state variable decreases over time, this is interpreted as a decline in competition, as the 
exogenous influence on the firms’ premium setting decision is reduced. On the other 
hand, if the impact of a coverage variable decreases, this points to an increase in 
competition, since firms were able to reduce the premium on the specific coverage 
package, implying that it was not priced competitively before. (Note that another 
interpretation would be a decrease in costs for the specific coverage, for which I found 
no evidence.) The interpretation does not allow to specify the actual “degree of 
competition”, it only allows to detect shifts towards a more or less competitive market 
structure.   
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3.5.1. General  Results 
Table 3.5. shows the regression coefficients for plan offers to 65 year-old men. To 
increase readability, Table 3.5. is split by the type of variables, i.e. by plan and 
state characteristics. The top of panel a) includes a “predicted base premium”, 
which is calculated from the estimated coefficients on the state variables at their 
means and the estimation constant, and thus depicts the estimated rate for (i) a 
standard plan, with (ii) no additional coverage, sold (iii) under Attained Age rating 
in the average state (see Appendix Table 3.1. for the state means).
33 All 
coefficients in Table 3.5. will be related to these base premiums and since most 
variables are indicator variables, their coefficients serve as a percentage shift of (or 
a “mark-up” to) the base premium when the indicator is “switched on”. The ratio 
of predicted base premiums in 2002 and 1998 is 1.36, implying an 8 percent 
increase per year, identical to the unconditional premium increase mentioned in the 
earlier discussion of Table 3.3. for the basic coverage. Also a similar pattern of 
smaller increases in 1999 and 2000 and larger ones towards 2002 is present.  
In the remainder of panel a) the coefficients of the state characteristics and the 
estimation constant are depicted. The constant, which captures the base premium 
without the influence of the state variables, actually declines over time by 35 percent 
(as measured by the difference in coefficients). Offsetting this decline and leading to 
the enormous increase in the predicted base premium is the increasing influence of the 
Medicare adjusted costs (as the mean for the adjusted costs does not change a lot over 
time). The unit of the adjusted costs is $100, thus a one unit increase in the adjusted 
costs increases the base premium by 11 percent ($61) in1998 and 30 percent ($232) in 
2002. Since this variable captures state differences in health, over time these
                                                 
33 The calculation is as follows:  ) exp( ˆ 0 B st B y β β + = , where the calculation of the standard error 
assumes a covariance of zero between the Bst variables. While this assumptions may not be correct, the 
correlations are mainly positive, and thus the estimate of the standard error is likely too large.  
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differences have become more important in the price setting decision of firms, 
indicating an increase in competition. 
While the impact of managed Medicare competition on premiums decreases from 
about 2.1 to 1.5 percent for a ten percent increase in the penetration rate, the dollar 
impact on premiums remains almost the same, decreasing from $12.2 in 1998 to $11.6 
in 2002. Since the Medicare adjusted costs are taking into account state specific 
differences, there is some correlation between the costs and the other state variables, 
most important between the costs and the per capita income. In regressions (not 
reported) run separately for income and costs, the influence of costs was slightly lower 
than presented in Table 3.5., while the per capita income had a small positive effect. 
The correlation between the two explains why states have a 0.6 to 0.9 percent lower 
premium with a $1000 increase of per capita income. The effect of unemployment is 
never significant and very small, and thus it probably is not suited very well to capture 
competition with employer provided supplemental insurance. The influence of the 
number of firms in the market and its square is rather small, but turns significant after 
2000. If there is any inference to be drawn from these effects, it is that towards the end 
of the period, the rate at which the premiums increase decreases with the number of 
firms, as given by the negative estimates on the square term. 
In panel b) of Table 3.5., the influence of the insurance policy characteristics are 
depicted. In 1998, compared to having a basic policy without any additional coverage 
(plan A), a plan with Medicare Part A deductible increased the premium by almost 36 
percent ($208 in terms of the predicted base premium). Coverage for the Part B 
deductible added 19 percent ($110), the coverage of at home recovery costs meant a 7 
percent ($41) higher premium, and preventive services and Medicare Part B excess 
charges increased premiums by 14 and 10 percent ($78 and $55), respectively. The 
highest mark-up came through prescription drug coverage: for the basic coverage, the  
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base premium increased by 60 percent ($348), whereas 54 percent ($311) were added 
for the extended coverage. 
To compare the development over time, it is important to relate the coverage 
indicators to the development of the predicted base premium. For example, the mark-
up for the part A deductible decreased significantly from 1998 to 2002 by about 6 
percent, with the biggest drop in 2002. Since at the same time, the base premium 
increased by 35 percent, premiums for plans covering the part A deductible have still 
increased, but at a slightly lower rate than the base premium, as over time, the mark-
up has decreased. Similarly, the influences of coverage for at home recovery, 
preventive care and part B excess charges have declined by 5, 6, and 6 percent, 
respectively, from 1998 to 2002. The mark-up for the part B deductible remained 
relatively constant over the years, while the premium for prescription drug coverage 
(both basic and extended) first increased by more than 20 percent, to then drop to 
mark-ups levels of about 70 percent of the base premium in 2002.  
1998 is the only year in which the policies for smokers are not significantly 
different from standard policies, in the all other years, they are priced between 7 and 
11 percent higher. On the other hand, insurers charged between 16 and 25 percent less 
for select policies in all years, where once again, the difference is smallest in 2001 and 
2002. The Attained Age policies have premiums below those with Issued Age rating 
and Community Rating plans, but both differences are declining over time from 23 to 
17 percent (Issued Age) and 26 to 22 percent (Community Rating), thus the relative 
increase for these rating methods is less than for the Attained Age premiums.  
Overall Table 3.5. suggests that state variables matter in the determination of 
premiums, and that over time, their influence increased, indicating that competition 
increased over time as well. In this regard, the decreasing influence of the policy  
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specific characteristics point in the same direction – as competition increases, the 
mark-ups for certain coverage packages decrease.  
 
3.5.2.  Comparisons by Gender and Age  
Table 3.6. shows the predicted base premiums based on gender and age. The first 
four rows in panel a) show the log base premium calculated in the same way as in 
Table 3.5., thus reflecting the predicted premiums in the average state for a 
standard plan without additional coverage under Attained Age rating. The only 
difference in these premiums is in the gender or the age group, such that the four 
rows are for men and women at 65, and for men at 75 and 85 years of age, 
respectively. Panel b) then shows the predicted premiums, i.e. the exponentiated 
log premiums. 
All premiums follow a similar pattern, and increase by roughly 30 percent over 
the period of observation. For all estimates, the variation increases as the precision of 
the estimated coefficients declines towards 2002. The premiums charged to women 
are only slightly lower than those charged to men – on average about 1.3 percent or 
$9. None of these differences is significant, which is also true for all differences in 
coefficients from Table 3.5. between premiums for men and women.
34 Men that are 75 
years old pay on average 30 percent more than their 65 year old counterparts. This 
differences is relatively constant over time, and due to the general increase in 
premiums, the absolute difference then increases from $212 in 1998 to $256 in 2002. 
Similarly, the differential between premiums for 65 year-old men and those for 85 
year-old men is about 45 percent, implying an increase in the gap from $345 to $424. 
Both of these differences are significant throughout, although with less precision 
towards 2002.  
                                                 
34 For completeness, the coefficients from the estimations for offers to women as well as those from the 
regressions for offers to 75 and 85 year-old men are reported in appendix tables A3.2., A3.3., and A3.4.  
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Table 3.6.: Predicted Base Premiums by Gender and Age 
       
a) Log of Base Premium     
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
65  Year-Old  Men  6.3621 6.4264 6.4827 6.5554 6.6667 
  (0.068) (0.073) (0.088) (0.149) (0.152) 
65  Year-Old  Women  6.3513 6.4127 6.4731 6.5421 6.6490 
  (0.067) (0.072) (0.088) (0.151) (0.155) 
75  Year-Old  Men  6.6745 6.7380 6.7805 6.8404 6.9491 
  (0.042) (0.049) (0.057) (0.086) (0.087) 
85  Year-Old  Men  6.8301 6.8891 6.9432 7.0009 7.0985 
  (0.072) (0.079) (0.097) (0.150) (0.153) 
       
b) Predicted Base Premium     
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
65  Year-Old  Men 579 618 654 703 786 
  (39) (45) (57)  (105)  (120) 
65  Year-Old  Women  573 610 648 694 772 
  (38) (44) (57)  (105)  (120) 
75  Year-Old  Men 792 844 880 935  1042 
  (33) (42) (50) (80) (90) 
85 Year-Old Men  925  982  1036  1098  1210 
  (67)  (78)  (101) (165) (186) 
 
Notes 
The log of base premiums are estimated from the estimated coefficients at the state means 
(Appendix Table 3.1.) for a standard plan without additional coverage, sold at Attained Age 
rating. Standard errors are estimated assuming no correlation between the variables. The 
predicted base premiums are the exponentiated log premiums, standard errors are obtained 
with the delta method.  
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss data 1998-2002 and ARF 2004. 
       
       
As mentioned, there are no differences in coefficients between men and women 
(comparing Table 3.5. and Appendix Table 3.2.). Table 3.7. shows the mean  
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Table 3.7.: Mean Coefficient Differences Between Age Groups 
         
  to 75 Year-Olds  to 85 Year-Olds 
Plans covering          
   Medicare part A Deductible  0.0199**  0.0296 ***
 
(0.009) (0.009)  
   Medicare part B Deductible  0.0032   0.0166 ** 
 
(0.006) (0.007)  
   At Home Recovery Costs  0.0218*** 0.0455 ***
 
(0.005) (0.005)  
   Preventive Services  0.0094   0.0169   
 
(0.016) (0.016)  
   Medicare part B Excess Charges  -0.0015   -0.0037   
 
(0.004) (0.004)  
   Prescription Drugs (basic)  -0.0211   -0.0269   
 
(0.026) (0.027)  
   Prescription Drugs (extended)  -0.0584**  -0.1136 ***
 
(0.026) (0.027)  
Smoker Policy  0.0267   0.0332 * 
 
(0.018) (0.018)  
Select Policy  -0.0081   -0.0145   
 
(0.026) (0.026)  
Issued Age Rating  -0.1021*** -0.1562 ***
 
(0.020) (0.020)  
Community Rating   -0.3266*** -0.4750 ***
 
(0.033) (0.033)  
Medicare Adjusted Per Capita Costs -0.0651*** -0.0839 ***
 
(0.025) (0.024)  
 
Notes: 
Mean differences from the differences in coefficients for men, from estimates in Table 3.5. and 
Appendix Tables 3.3. (for age 75) and 3.4. (for age 85). Standard errors in parenthesis.  
*, **, ***: significant on a 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss data 1998-2002 and ARF 2004. 
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differences in coefficients between the age groups for men (from Table 3.5. and 
Appendix Tables 3.3. and 3.4.). Certain changes in the impact are expected when 
moving from the group of 65 year-olds to 75 or 85 year-olds. For example, 
covering the inpatient deductible costs about 2 percent more for 75 year-olds than 
for 65 year-olds, and the difference increases to 3 percent for the 85 year-olds (first 
row). The increase is due to the fact that the likelihood of a hospital stay increases 
with age and insurance companies face higher expected costs. Similar 
considerations explain the increases in the home health care mark-up, and that for 
the part B deductible. Interestingly, the coverage mark-up for extended 
prescription drug coverage declines with age, by 6 and 11 percent for age groups 
75 and 85, respectively. Clearly older beneficiaries should not buy into Attained 
Age plans when first buying a Medigap plan: Issued Age plans are 10 and 16 
percent less expensive, at age 75 and 85, respectively, whereas the differential 
amounts to 33 and 48 percent for Community Rated plans. Of the state variables, 
only the difference for the Medicare adjusted costs are reported, as all other ones 
are very close to zero and not significant. While the coefficient differential is 
negative between age 65 and the older groups, it is almost completely offset by the 
increase in means for this variable (compare to Appendix Table 3.1.), such that the 
dollar increase due to differences in Medicare adjusted costs is the same for all 
groups.  
 
3.5.3. Explained  Variation 
Table 3.8. now depicts the degree of explanatory power that is provided by state 
and firm fixed effects. Panel a) contains the results of the two stage procedure 
outlined in section 3.4.2., where first the log premiums are regressed on fully 
interacted indicators of plan letter, plan type and rating method. The first row  
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Table 3.8.: Comparison of Firm vs. State Explanatory Power 
       
a) Regression on Plan Letter-Plan Type-Rating Interactions 
       
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
       
Number of First Stage Effects  78  80  81  80  81 
Residual Variation Explained  
   By State Effects  0.105 0.102 0.110 0.183 0.156 
Number  of  State  effects  47 47 47 47 47 
Residual Variation Explained  
   By Firm Effects  0.370 0.365 0.331 0.292 0.275 
Number  of  Firm  Effects  146 145 139 103 105 
Observations  9731 10658 10250 8105  8189 
       
b) Regression on State-Plan Letter-Plan Type-Rating Interactions 
       
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of First Stage Effects  1526  1565  1644  1572  1528 
Residual Variation Explained  
   By Firm Effects  0.401 0.398 0.350 0.337 0.315 
Number  of  Firm  Effects  146 145 139 103 105 
Observations  9731 10658 10250 8105  8189 
 
Notes: 
The sample is restricted to policy offers for 65 year-old men. The "residual variation" depicts 
the R
2 from a fixed effects regression of the residual from the first stage on the state or firm 
effects. The number of first stage effects refers to mutually exclusive cells, depending on the 
definition. See text for details. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss data 1998-2002. 
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shows how many indicators are used in each year, where the sample is once again 
restricted to premiums offered to 65 year-old men. (The results are similar for the 
other samples.) The adjusted R
2 for a regression of the residuals from the first stage 
on state fixed effects is given in the second row, whereas the number of fixed 
effects follows in the row below. The degree of variation explained by the firm 
fixed effects and the number of firm effects used are presented in the fourth and 
fifth row, respectively.  
The degree of variation explained by the state fixed effects is not large, but it 
increases over time, most notably from 11 to 18 percent from 2000 to 2001. At the 
same time, the degree of variation explained by firm specific effects decreases 
gradually over time – from 37 to 27 percent. Both effects suggest, that state variables 
affected premiums stronger after 2000, while firm effects lose their influence on 
premiums, which is complementary to the discussion of Table 3.5. in section 3.5.1. 
Panel b) shows the results with the alternative first stage regressions, where the 
log premiums are regressed on the indicators of full interactions of state, plan letter, 
plan type and rating method. Again the first row depicts the number of these 
indicators, while the second shows the residual variation that is explained by the firm 
effect. The results are in line with the previous findings as well: the degree to which 
firm specific effects explain the variation in premiums decreases, suggesting that the 
degree of competition has increased in the Medigap market over time. Note that the 
finding of firm effects explaining price variation in any year does not lead to the above 
conclusion – indeed it could be that the individuals buying policies from the different 
firms are inherently different from one firm to another and thus the firms have to 
charge different premiums. It is the change in the degree of variation explained that 
allows this interpretation. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I analyze the variation in premiums for insurance policies offered 
in the Medigap market. The analysis focuses on a year by year comparison from 
1998 to 2002, and allows conclusions about the impact of coverage packages and 
state characteristics on Medigap premiums. Changes in these impacts are related to 
the competitive structure of the market. In addition, the degree to which state and 
firm specific variation explain premium variation is investigated and interpreted as 
a measure of competitiveness in the Medigap market.  
In particular, differences in insurance coverage account for large amounts of the 
price variation present in the market. In 2002, the yearly premium for a basic plan with 
coverage only for Medicare part A and B coinsurance as well as three pints of blood is 
estimated to be $786. When adding coverage for other gaps in Medicare, this base 
premium is increased significantly. For example, the mark-up for extended 
prescription drug coverage amounts to $47 a month. Select plans are an alternative 
that is significantly less expensive than standard plans, the differential in 2002 is at 
$135 a year. While young individuals profit from buying Attained Age policies ($130 
and $174 less than Issued Age and Community Rated plans, respectively), this 
relationship is reversed with age. In addition, state variables have some influence, 
most notably decreases in the health of the Medicare population (as measured by 
increases in the Medicare adjusted costs) and increases in the degree of managed 
Medicare penetration increase premiums.  
The analysis also shows that the market changed significantly from 1998 to 2002. 
The number of active firms declined from 146 to 105, which also led to a reduction in 
plan offers by 15 percent, as measured by offers to 65 year-old men. Almost all 
coverage mark-ups decline over this period, which is an indication that they were (or 
still are) not priced competitively. This finding is strengthened by an unconditional  
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reduction in real premium growth towards 2002 and by a decrease in firm specific 
variation in insurance premiums. Taken together, this leads to the conclusion that 
while variation in premiums for Medigap insurance policies still exists, the 
competition has increased over time and the firm specific influence on premiums has 
decreased.  
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3.7. Appendix  Tables 
 
Appendix Table 3.1: State Variable Means 
       
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Medicare Adjusted Costs:       
   Male, 65  3.399  3.382  3.422  3.583  3.580 
 
(0.503) (0.460) (0.425) (0.287) (0.256) 
   Male, 75  5.101  5.075  5.129  5.375  5.349 
 
(0.755) (0.690) (0.637) (0.430) (0.382) 
   Male, 85  6.023  5.992  6.046  6.342  6.279 
 
(0.892) (0.814) (0.751) (0.508) (0.448) 
   Female, 65  2.923  2.909  2.943  3.081  3.081 
 
(0.433) (0.395) (0.366) (0.247) (0.220) 
   Female, 75  4.250  4.229  4.275  4.479  4.464 
 
(0.629) (0.575) (0.531) (0.358) (0.319) 
   Female, 85  5.309  5.281  5.328  5.589  5.531 
 
(0.786) (0.717) (0.662) (0.447) (0.395) 
Managed Medicare Penetration  0.112  0.123  0.122  0.119  0.106 
 
(0.108) (0.116) (0.116) (0.114) (0.109) 
Per Capita Income  2.498  2.629  2.664  2.649  2.714 
 
(0.423) (0.414) (0.434) (0.431) (0.435) 
Unemployment  Rate  5.045 4.733 4.441 4.200 4.830 
 
(1.226) (1.181) (1.061) (1.041) (0.975) 
Number of Firms In The Market 13.13  14.02  12.52  8.52  11.90 
 
(10.27) (9.72) (10.36) (6.93)  (8.15) 
Observations  48 48 48 48 48 
 
Notes: 
All means (except the number of firms) are generated from county level information weighted 
by the number of Medicare beneficiaries in the respective county. Standard deviations depicted 
in parentheses.  
Medicare Adjusted costs in $100, per capita income in $10000, in year 2000 levels. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ARF 2004 and Weiss data, 1998-2002.  
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Appendix Table 3.2.: Regression Coefficients for Insurance Policy  
Offers to 65 Year-Old Women 
                 
  1998 1999 2000 2001  2002
Part A Deductible  0.359*** 0.340*** 0.321*** 0.322 ***  0.295***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)
Part B Deductible  0.189*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.168 ***  0.184***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.01)
At Home Recovery  0.070*** 0.064*** 0.040*** 0.039 ***  0.022***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00)
Preventive Services  0.136*** 0.134*** 0.083*** 0.086 ***  0.070***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.02)
Part B Excess Charges  0.096*** 0.077*** 0.061*** 0.051 ***  0.031***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00)
Rx Coverage (basic)  0.602*** 0.629*** 0.803*** 0.768 ***  0.716***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)
Rx Coverage (ext.)  0.536*** 0.584*** 0.781*** 0.854 ***  0.723***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)
Smoker Policy  0.027   0.063*** 0.072*** 0.109 ***  0.097***
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)
Select Policy  -0.218*** -0.222*** -0.255*** -0.171 ***  -0.179***
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)
Issued Age Rating  0.228*** 0.232*** 0.197*** 0.181 ***  0.171***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)    (0.02)
Community Rating   0.273*** 0.296*** 0.282*** 0.278 ***  0.238***
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)    (0.03)
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Appendix Table 2.2.: (continued) 
    
  1998 1999 2000 2001  2002
Costs, Female, 65  0.122*** 0.148*** 0.182*** 0.311 ***  0.341***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)    (0.04)
HMO Penetration   0.213*** 0.189*** 0.176*** 0.166 ***  0.155***
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)    (0.05)
Per Capita Income  -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.069 ***  -0.089***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)
Unemployment Rate  0.002   -0.003   0.002   0.005    0.002  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)    (0.01)
Number of Firms   0.001   0.001   0.000   0.006 ***  0.005**
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00)
Square of Above  1.E-05   8.E-07   4.E-06   -1.E-04 **  -9.E-05  
 
(3E-05) (2E-05) (3E-05) (6E-05)    (6E-05)
Constant 6.106*** 6.119*** 6.066*** 5.680 ***  5.767***
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)    (0.09)
      
Observations 9731 10658 10250 8105    8189 
Number of Firms  147 146 140 104    106 
Adjusted R2  0.736 0.703 0.688 0.651    0.533 
 
Notes:  
The sample is restricted to policy offers to 65 year-old women. Omitted categories are “Basic 
Coverage Only”, “Standard Policy”, and “Attained Age Rating”. The estimation is performed 
with a firm-fixed effects procedure. The standard errors (in parentheses) are allowing for 
clustered errors on State-Firm groups.  
*, **, ***: significant on a 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss data 1998-2002 and ARF 2004. 
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Appendix Table 3.3.: Regression Coefficients for Insurance Policy  
Offers to 75 Year-Old Men 
                 
  1998 1999 2000 2001  2002
Part A Deductible  0.381*** 0.363*** 0.343*** 0.345 ***  0.317***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)
Part B Deductible  0.190*** 0.189*** 0.194*** 0.173 ***  0.182***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)    (0.01)
At Home Recovery  0.088*** 0.083*** 0.063*** 0.066 ***  0.043***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00)
Preventive Services  0.145*** 0.146*** 0.093*** 0.092 ***  0.081***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)
Part B Excess Charges  0.095*** 0.076*** 0.058*** 0.048 ***  0.030***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00)
Rx Coverage (basic)  0.590*** 0.621*** 0.794*** 0.731 ***  0.672***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)
Rx Coverage (ext.)  0.493*** 0.543*** 0.731*** 0.779 ***  0.646***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)    (0.02)
Smoker Policy  0.057*** 0.107*** 0.110*** 0.132 ***  0.114***
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)
Select Policy  -0.217*** -0.215*** -0.251*** -0.186 ***  -0.189***
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)
Issued Age Rating  0.111*** 0.114*** 0.091*** 0.083 ***  0.074***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)    (0.02)
Community Rating   -0.082*** -0.071*** -0.061*** -0.039    -0.076***
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)    (0.03)
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Appendix Table 2.3.: (continued) 
    
  1998 1999 2000 2001  2002
Costs, Female, 65  0.068*** 0.086*** 0.103*** 0.177 ***  0.194***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)    (0.02)
HMO Penetration   0.192*** 0.173*** 0.158*** 0.160 ***  0.143***
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)    (0.05)
Per Capita Income  -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.062 ***  -0.082***
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)
Unemployment Rate  0.002   -0.003   0.004   0.006    0.003  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)    (0.01)
Number of Firms   0.001   0.002*  0.001   0.007 ***  0.006***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00)
Square of Above  2.E-05   -1.E-05   -1.E-05   -1.E-04 **  -1.E-04* 
 
(3E-05) (3E-05) (3E-05) (6E-05)    (6E-05)
Constant 6.433*** 6.420*** 6.342*** 5.962 ***  6.051***
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)    (0.09)
      
Observations 9731 10658 10250 8106    8189 
Number of Firms  147 146 140 104    106 
Adjusted R2  0.709 0.680 0.659 0.628    0.508 
 
Notes:  
The sample is restricted to policy offers to 75 year-old men. Omitted categories are “Basic 
Coverage Only”, “Standard Policy”, and “Attained Age Rating”. The estimation is performed 
with a firm-fixed effects procedure. The standard errors (in parentheses) are allowing for 
clustered errors on State-Firm groups. 
*, **, ***: significant on a 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss data 1998-2002 and ARF 2004. 
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Appendix Table 3.4.: Regression Coefficients for Insurance Policy  
Offers to 85 Year-Old Men 
                 
  1998 1999 2000 2001  2002
Part A Deductible  0.390*** 0.374*** 0.352*** 0.354 ***  0.328***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)
Part B Deductible  0.204*** 0.203*** 0.207*** 0.186 ***  0.196***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)    (0.01)
At Home Recovery  0.107*** 0.106*** 0.085*** 0.091 ***  0.071***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00)
Preventive Services  0.156*** 0.159*** 0.105*** 0.091 ***  0.084***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)
Part B Excess Charges  0.093*** 0.073*** 0.056*** 0.046 ***  0.028***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00)
Rx Coverage (basic)  0.598*** 0.621*** 0.799*** 0.711 ***  0.650***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)
Rx Coverage (ext.)  0.457*** 0.494*** 0.680*** 0.715 ***  0.571***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)    (0.02)
Smoker Policy  0.063*** 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.136 ***  0.117***
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)
Select Policy  -0.222*** -0.221*** -0.254*** -0.197 ***  -0.196***
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)
Issued Age Rating  0.053*** 0.055*** 0.033** 0.034 **  0.027* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)    (0.02)
Community Rating   -0.225*** -0.214*** -0.218*** -0.194 ***  -0.221***
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)    (0.03)
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Appendix Table 2.4.: (continued) 
    
  1998 1999 2000 2001  2002
Costs, Female, 65  0.059*** 0.075*** 0.087*** 0.148 ***  0.166***
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)    (0.02)
HMO Penetration   0.196*** 0.168*** 0.158*** 0.168 ***  0.143***
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)    (0.05)
Per Capita Income  -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.052*** -0.061 ***  -0.081***
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)
Unemployment Rate  0.002   -0.005   0.004   0.006    0.000  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)    (0.01)
Number of Firms   0.001   0.003*  0.002   0.006 **  0.004* 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00)
Square of Above  2.E-05   -2.E-05   -2.E-05   -1.E-04 *  -5.E-05  
 
(3E-05) (3E-05) (4E-05) (6E-05)    (6E-05)
Constant 6.582*** 6.569*** 6.498*** 6.137 ***  6.217***
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09)    (0.09)
      
Observations 9296 10414 10010 8050    8058 
Number of Firms  146 145 139 104    106 
Adjusted R2  0.703 0.665 0.637 0.620    0.520 
 
Notes:  
The sample is restricted to policy offers to 85 year-old men. Omitted categories are "Basic 
Coverage Only", "Standard Policy", and "Attained Age Rating". The estimation is performed 
with a firm-fixed effects procedure. The standard errors (in parentheses) are allowing for 
clustered errors on State-Firm groups. 
*, **, ***: significant on a 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Weiss data 1998-2002 and ARF 2004. 
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4.CHAPTER FOUR 
PREMIUM VARIATION AND CONSUMER SEARCH COSTS 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we investigate why price variation is sustained in the Medigap 
market. As discussed in the first chapter, because of the standardization imposed 
by OBRA 1990, the Medigap market is in essence a market with homogeneous 
goods. The existence of price variation in a market with homogeneous goods is an 
indicator of imperfect information in the market (e.g., see Stiglitz, 1989), and 
suggests that when consumers buy high-priced Medigap policies instead of 
identical lower-priced ones, welfare losses occur. To guide our analysis, we apply 
a theoretical model by Carlson and McAfee (1983) that explains the existence of a 
discrete price distribution in a market for homogenous goods with differences in 
cost structures among firms and search costs to consumers. The Carlson-McAfee 
model has been used to study price variation in a variety of settings. For example, 
Dahlby and West (1986) found support for the model’s main predictions in the 
market for auto insurance. In a study of local pharmacy markets in upstate New 
York, Sorensen (2000) found more variation in prices for acute-care medications 
than for medications used to treat long-term chronic conditions, where the 
expected gains from searching were larger. Horteçsu and Syverson (2004) applied 
the Carlson-McAfee model to the market for S&P 500 index funds, finding that 
increased market participation by novice investors moved the search cost 
distribution rightward, supporting the existence of more expensive funds.  
Applying the Carlson-McAfee model to the Medigap market, we estimate a 
maximum search cost of $430, leading to an average search cost of $215. By way of  
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comparison, average search costs ranged from $28 to $125 in the market for auto 
insurance (Dahlby and West, 1986), and between $5 and $30 for every $10,000 of 
assets invested in the mutual fund market (Horteçsu and Syverson, 2004). Our 
findings suggests that many elderly consumers do not know where to find the lowest 
prices in the market, and face costs of search that are high enough to prevent most of 
them from searching until they find the lowest price. Our results imply that in two-
thirds of all markets nationwide, only about eleven percent of individuals find the 
lowest priced policy.  
We begin by discussing theories of price variation and then present an augmented 
version of the Carlson-McAfee search cost model. We describe our data in section 
4.3., and estimate the search cost model’s main equations in section 4.4. We conclude 
with a summary of our findings and a brief discussion. 
 
4.2. Theoretical  Framework 
4.2.1.  An Overview of Theories of Price Variation  
In general, there are three potential explanations for sustained price dispersion in a 
homogenous goods market. The first is cross subsidization within a firm. In this 
scenario, a firm sells products in more than one market, allows for losses in one (or 
more) of them, and subsidizes the losses with profits made in other markets. In the 
Medigap context, firms could offer Plan A very cheaply (i.e. below costs) in order 
to attract people to the company. Then the firm could present the other plans it 
offers, which (by definition) are better plans in terms of coverage and thus are 
more expensive. The premiums for these plans would be above costs, and thus the 
firm could offset losses on Plan A (and perhaps make profits) if enough consumers 
decide to buy the more expensive plan. If only some firms engaged in this kind of 
pricing, or if all did but to different extents, prices could vary. It is unlikely that  
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firms engage in this kind of cross-subsidization, however, because federal Medigap 
regulations require insurers to maintain loss ratios (the ratio of claims to 
premiums) of at least 65 percent for individual plans, and 75 percent for group 
plans. If that ratio is not met, the insurer has to pay transfers to his policyholders. 
If, as is usually assumed, the administrative costs for Medigap policies are about 
10-15 percent of total costs (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2006b), 
there remains a maximum profit margin of 25 percent for collected premiums.  
Firms could also cross subsidize across insurance markets by operating in the 
Medigap market with losses, but subsidizing these losses with profits from an entirely 
different insurance market, say long term care or life insurance. In other words, 
Medigap policies could be thought of as “loss leaders.” Only about 11 percent of 
Medigap plans in data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC, see next section) operate with losses, however, indicating that this type of 
cross subsidization, if it even exists, is relatively uncommon.  
Price variation could also persist if ostensibly homogeneous products are in fact 
differentiated on some dimension that is observable to consumers, but not to the 
researcher. Examples of product differentiation might include special discounts for 
spouses, financial stability of the insurance firm, or a reputation for efficient claims 
processing. Furthermore, advertising is a form of product differentiation, which in 
general does not alter the product, but increases knowledge and name recognition. 
While it is likely that some unobserved product differentiation exists in the Medigap 
market, it cannot plausibly explain price ranges where the maximum price is more 
than double the minimum price in some states and for some plan letters (see Tables 
1.2. and 1.3.).  
A third reason for equilibrium price dispersion is that firms differ in their costs of 
production, and these differences are sustained by the existence of consumer search  
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costs. Several theoretical papers have investigated the implications of incompletely 
informed consumers who have to gather information before they buy a product. Even 
with a large number of consumers and sellers, and no heterogeneity in production 
costs, Diamond (1971) concludes that the monopoly price prevails if there are search 
costs. Stiglitz (1989) shows how price dispersion arises through cost differentials in 
the presence of search costs, assuming that consumers are either fully informed or not 
at all informed (i.e., no learning about the market through sequential search) and a 
continuous distribution of prices. Carlson and McAfee (1983) relax these particular 
assumptions. They allow consumers to learn about the market through sequential 
search, and they assume a discrete price distribution, the latter feature being 
particularly relevant in the Medigap setting where there are relatively few firms 
operating in a given market. Perhaps most importantly, their model yields testable 
predictions. We explain their model and our augmentations in detail in the next 
section. 
 
4.2.2.  A Model of Search Costs and Price Dispersion 
Carlson and McAfee (1983) explain sustained price variation in a homogeneous 
goods market with consumer search costs and variation in production costs. The 
intuition behind their model is to assume incomplete information in the sense that 
consumers are not fully informed: while they know the price distribution they do not 
know which firm offers which price.
35  However, consumers can obtain information 
about firm-price pairs at a certain cost that is specific to the consumer. Heterogeneity 
in search costs lead to differences in the amount of information obtained, which allows 
for a non-degenerate price distribution to exist in the market.  
                                                 
35 Virtually all papers in the search cost literature assume a commonly known price distribution. This is 
necessary to evaluate any consumer’s expected (monetary) gain from searching. Otherwise it is not 
possible for a consumer to assess when to stop searching (in dynamic programming models).  
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Suppose all consumers gain utility uj if they buy a Medigap policy from firm j:  
 (4.1)  j j j p X u − = λ  , 
where Xj is a vector of firm j’s characteristics other than price, pj. Utility is linear, 
and it is normalized in terms of prices (i.e. there is no coefficient on pj). Although 
the consumer does not know which firms yield which level of utility, she can rank 
all possible utilities from highest to lowest, u1 ≥ u2 ≥…≥ uN. If only prices mattered 
( 0 λ = ) this would correspond to an ordering from lowest to highest price as in 
Carlson and MacAfee (1983). Here we allow factors other than price to also affect 
a firm’s ranking. Upon entering the market, the consumer searches once, drawing 
an offer from firm k, which she learns yields utility uk. Because she knows the 
ranking of all uj, the consumer can calculate the expected gain, wk, from searching 
again. The expected gain also depends on the probability of a firm being found, 
where we assume here that all firms N in a market are found with equal probability 
1/N. Then, for any utility uk, the expected gain is: 
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The consumer then compares the expected gain to her search cost to determine 
whether to buy this policy or to search for another one.
36 Each consumer has a 
search cost draw s from a cumulative distribution function G(s), with  () ' () gs G s = . 
The problem of search then becomes an optimal stopping problem: as long as s is 
lower than (or equal to) the expected gain, wk, the individual will continue to 
search and stop if and only if wk ≤ s ≤ wk+1. Since the distribution of expected gains 
                                                 
36 Search in Carlson and McAfee’s model occurs with replacement, i.e. the utility distribution does not 
change with the number of searches conducted. While this may seem unrealistic, note that consumers 
are not limited in the number of times they search, but only by their cost of searching again as it 
compares to their expected gain.  They can discard any draw from the utility distribution with lower 
utility than a previous draw at no cost.  
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is the same for all consumers, the search cost distribution, G(s), maps the searching 
individuals into groups of people that are associated with each firm’s utility rank.  
Figure 4.1 (slightly altered from Carlson/McAfee) depicts how the expected gains 
are distributed in an arbitrary example with five firms and gains from searching w1 < 
w2 < w3 < w4 < w5,, where w1 =0. Search costs are distributed uniformly on [0,S], and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Example of Search Cost and Information Distribution 
 
in this example, the maximum search cost is larger than the maximum possible 
gain, w5. W5 (or [S-w5]/S) then depicts the fraction of people in the market that 
buys the first plan they find. (This does not have to be the plan with the lowest 
utility, but recall that only people with a search cost draw of s > w5 will end up 
buying this plan.) W5 is also equivalent to the fraction of people that remains 
uninformed about all other firm-price combinations in the market, except for the 
1/S 
W4 W5 W3 W2  W1 
g(s) 
  w2           w3                        w4            w5                       S            s  
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one they acquire initially. Similar considerations apply to the other parts of the 
market, where W1 depicts the fraction of people who will always buy at the lowest 
price, since their search costs are lower than the smallest gain, w2. 
To determine the relative demand for each firm’s plan in the case of a general 
price distribution, we start by considering qN, the number of individuals that buys at 
the firm giving the lowest utility, uN. These are all people with search cost s ≥ wN, who 
are unlucky enough to draw this firm when entering the market: 
 (4.3N)   [] ) ( ) (
1
) (
1
N N N w G G
N
w s G
N
q − ∞ = ≥ = , 
where G(∞) represents the total number of individuals in the market, Q. Similarly, 
we can find the number of individuals that buys at the firm yielding the second 
lowest utility, firm N-1: 
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Intuitively, firm N-1 attracts 1/N of the consumers with the highest search costs 
and 1/(N-1) of those with the second highest search costs. In general, we can obtain 
each firm j’s demand as: 
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with  G(wN+1)=Q. Equations (4.2) and (4.3) can then be used to calculate the 
number of all consumers in any firm j based on the expected utility gain wj of 
further search associated with the firm, where we assume in line with  
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Carlson/McAfee that the search cost distribution is uniform on an interval [0,S]. 
This leads to  
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Substituting equation (4.2) into (4.3’) yields a demand equation in terms of the 
utilities associated with each firm j (see section 4.6.1. in Appendix 4.1. for the 
derivation):  
 (4.4)  () ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − − = j j u u
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1
1,  
where, as before, qj depicts the number of consumers in firm j. The demand thus 
depends on the difference in utility derived from firm j’s offer and the market 
average utility derived from this plan. When the utility gained from firm j’s plan 
offer increases, firm j’s market demand rises, as 
 (4.5) 
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Similarly, firm j’s demand also depends on the maximum search cost:  
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Thus an increase in search cost leads to a loss in demand for firms with above 
average plan utility, and demand gains for firms with below average utility. Hence 
an upward shift in search costs will lead to a reduction in the variance in market 
shares, and as S approaches infinity each firm’s market demand approaches the 
average market demand, Q/N. (In a situation where the maximum search cost 
approaches zero, the search cost distribution is degenerate and every consumer will 
buy at the firm(s) providing the largest utility, leading to the full information 
market outcome.) Note also that a reduction in firm j’s demand can be brought  
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about by an increase in firms N as well as by an increase in the utility provided by 
any other firm, as this increases the average market utility.  
We next turn to firm price setting decisions. Carlson and McAfee assume that 
firms differ in their (quadratic) cost functions:  
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where they assume αj ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 as conditions for profit maximization, and 
which are testable hypotheses in our model.
37 The profit function is 
 (4.8)  ( ) j j j j j q c q p − = Π  
and maximizing it with respect to price yields a system of N equations in N 
unknowns, which can be solved for each price pj (see section 4.6.2. in Appendix 
4.1. for the derivation).  
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Since only αj, and Xj  vary across firms, variation in pj is determined by firm-
specific costs and other characteristics of the firm from which consumers derive 
utility. 
 
                                                 
37 Note that the derivation in appendix A4.1. (section 4.6.3) shows that β is bounded from below by a 
values that could be less than zero. However, if β is estimated to be positive, firms will meet the profit 
maximization condition.   
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4.3. Data  Specifications 
We draw on two sources of data in the analyses. Once again, the main dataset is 
the data distributed by Weiss Ratings, Inc., where now only data from 1998 is 
considered. Our second dataset, from the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC), reports total premiums, claims, and covered lives for each 
plan letter offered by an insurance company in every state. In each year of NAIC 
data, the data are aggregated across policies issued during the previous three years. 
For example, the data for 1998 contain covered lives for policies issued by a 
particular firm in a given state in 1996, 1997 and 1998 combined. In order to match 
the NAIC data to the Weiss price data for 1998, we simply divide the three-year 
totals by three to obtain an estimate of the figures for 1998. This implicitly 
assumes that plans had the same influx of new policyholders in each of the three 
years.  
We merge the NAIC and Weiss data with the goal of creating a dataset that 
contains price, quantity sold (covered lives), and production costs (claims) for each 
Medigap plan offered by a firm in every market. However, the two datasets are not 
strictly comparable and three issues arise when attempting to merge them. We give an 
overview of the major issues here, while section 4.7. in Appendix 4.2. describes the 
merge procedures in detail. First, as the NAIC data are available at the state level, we 
must aggregate up the Weiss data. As discussed earlier, we do not lose much 
information since insurers predominantly vary premiums across states, rather than 
within states.  
Second, while the Weiss data list premiums by age, the NAIC data report covered 
lives for all ages combined. Because health status varies with age, we wish to avoid 
attributing prices offered to a relatively healthy group to the quantity purchased by a 
less healthy group (or vice versa). This concern is mitigated by the fact that most  
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people who buy Medigap policies buy them when they turn 65 years old. Since those 
who bought policies at age 65 dominate total covered lives, age 65 premiums should 
be well matched to the market share averaged over all ages. One way of testing this 
assertion is to assess whether a firm’s market share is likely to vary substantially by 
the policyholder’s age. In our model, a firm’s market share is uniquely determined by 
the utility it offers relative to the average utility offered by other firms in the market. If 
the relative utility offered does not vary with age, then the firm’s market share for 
each age will equal its average market share over all ages. We can readily test whether 
this is the case when  0 λ =  by computing relative premiums by policyholder age for 
each firm (using the Weiss data) in every market, and then computing a measure of the 
age-related variation in relative premiums for each firm (in every market). We find 
that relative premiums do not vary much by age: the average within-firm standard 
deviation of relative premiums as a percent of the market average premium is just 3.3 
percent; in 75 percent of state-firm-plan letter-rating method observations the standard 
deviation over age groups is 4.6 percent or less, and in 90 percent the standard 
deviation over age groups is 7.1 percent or less. We conclude that since relative 
premiums do not vary much by age within firms, market shares are unlikely to vary 
much by age, and thus age 65 premiums are well matched to market shares that are 
averaged over all ages. 
Finally, the NAIC data are comprehensive whereas the Weiss data are not. In 
merging the Weiss and NAIC data, we retain 91 percent of total covered lives 
represented in the NAIC data, consistent with the market coverage rate reported by 
Weiss for that time period. Table 4.1. compares firms in our merged subsample with 
the NAIC “universe.” We retain 133 out of 186 firms found in the NAIC file (72 
percent). The excluded firms are disproportionately inactive participants in the market 
or sell very few policies (and hence do not appear in the Weiss data). For example, the  
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Table 4.1.: Summary Statistics for Merged Sample and NAIC Universe 
    
 
Merged 
Weiss-NAIC 
Sample 
NAIC 
Universe 
Firms    
Number of Firms  133  186 
Median Total Covered Lives   3,934  1,435 
Median Total Premiums  (in 1000)  $3,734  $1,753  
Median Total Claims  (in 1000)  $2,605  $1,236  
Operates in Less Than 19 States  0.729  0.715 
Operates in 19 to 44 States  0.24  0.199 
Operates in More Than States  0.03  0.086 
Loss Ratio > 1  0.038  0.108 
Weiss Rating A  0.12  -- 
Weiss Rating B  0.436  -- 
Weiss Rating C  0.165  -- 
Weiss Rating D or Worse  0.157  -- 
No Weiss Rating  0.12  -- 
    
Policies    
Agent Solicited Policy  0.662  0.608 
Direct Solicited Policy  0.346  0.328 
Average Months Policy on Market  66.6  66.7 
Fraction Of Covered Lives      
   in Plan A  0.048  0.049 
   in Plan C  0.255  0.255 
   in Plan F  0.423  0.422 
   in All Other Plans   0.274  0.274 
   in Attained Age Plans  0.44  -- 
   in Issue Age Plans  0.303  -- 
   in Community Rated Plans  0.257  -- 
    
  
  108
Table 4.1.: (continued) 
    
 
Merged 
Weiss-NAIC 
Sample 
NAIC 
Universe 
Markets    
Number of Markets   1216  -- 
Number of Firms per Market: Mean (Max)  5.5 (31.0)  -- 
Fraction of Markets with One Firm  0.385  -- 
Mean Number Plan Letters Offered by Firms in 
Market 
6.6 -- 
    
 
Notes: 
See Appendix 4.2. for merge details. Covered lives, premiums and claims are shown here as 
three-year totals over the period 1996-1998, as reported by NAIC. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Weiss data, 1998, and NAIC data, 1998. 
    
    
median firm in our subsample issued 3,934 new policies between 1996 and 1998, 
compared to 1,435 new policies in the NAIC file. The median firm in our 
subsample earned more than twice the premiums of the median firm in the NAIC 
file between 1996 and 1998 ($3.7 versus $1.8 million), and incurred more than 
twice the claims ($2.6 versus $1.2 million).  
The Medigap market is populated by a few large firms that operate in almost 
every state, and a large number of small firms that operate in select states. For 
example, just three percent of firms operate in more than 44 states, but this three 
percent accounts for one third of all covered lives nationwide. Another one-third of 
covered lives are accounted for by the 24 percent of firms who operate in 19 to 44 
states, and the last one-third of covered lives is accounted for by the 73 percent of 
firms that operate in fewer than 19 states. These distributions are similar in the NAIC 
file and our merged sample, although our merged sample does contain significantly  
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fewer of the largest firms operating in more than 44 states (3 percent v. 8.6 percent). 
The data reveal substantial heterogeneity in the financial stability of firms selling 
Medigap policies. Only 12 percent of firms enjoy a Weiss financial safety rating of A- 
or better, about 44 percent receive a B+, B or B-, and 32 percent receive a C+ or 
lower. About 12 percent of firms in our sample are not rated by Weiss.  
Turning to characteristics of the policies themselves, about 62 percent of all 
Medigap policies are agent solicited in our merged sample, which compares to about 
61 percent in the NAIC file. About one-third are sold directly by the insurance 
company in both our merged sample and the NAIC file. The average policy has been 
on the market for about 67 months in both files. The distribution of policyholders over 
plan letters is similar in both our merged sample and the NAIC file, with the average 
firm enrolling approximately five percent of policyholders in Plan A, about 25 percent 
in Plan C, and 42 percent in Plan F. The remaining seven standardized plan letters 
enroll just 27 percent of policyholders. About 44 percent of policyholders are in 
Attained Age plans, 30 percent are in Issued Age plans, and 26 percent are in 
Community Rated plans.  
Finally, our merged sample contains 1,216 markets nationwide, where markets 
are defined by state-plan letter-rating method combinations. The average number of 
firms per market is 5.5 and the largest market has 31 firms. In 38.5 percent of markets 
only one firm operates; these tend to be Community Rated markets for less popular 
plan letters. 
 
4.4.  Empirical Analyses  
4.4.1.  Analysis of Firm Costs 
Before attempting to directly estimate search costs in the Medigap market, we 
begin by assessing whether our data support the main empirical predictions of the  
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Carlson-MacAfee model. In this section, we estimate the cost equation presented in 
(4.7), and test whether the profit-maximizing conditions, αj ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0, hold. Our 
measure of firm costs is the dollar amount of claims incurred by the insurance 
firm. While claims are just one component of costs, they are the major variable 
cost that firms face, and they vary across markets. We exclude from our estimation 
sample firms with fewer than 30 policyholders in any market because these firms 
could be subject to extreme values in their claims. For firms with more 
policyholders, these extreme claims will average out as the number of covered 
lives increases. We use covered lives as our measure of quantity.  
Ideally, we would like to estimate the cost equation separately for each market, 
but this is not possible given the relatively small number of firms operating in each of 
our markets. Instead, we estimate the cost equation using 2,357 firm-state-plan-rating 
observations, where we control for market characteristics by including state-plan 
letter-rating method effects: 
 (4.7’) 
2
jspr j jspr jspr spr jspr cq q α βσ ν =+ + +   , 
where the jspr subscript refers to firm j in state s selling plan letter p under rating 
method  r.  Identification of the firm-specific first order effects (αj) comes from 
variation within a firm over the different spr markets it operates in. We allow the 
stochastic error term, υjspr, to be clustered by firm. 
Table 4.2. shows our estimation results for two specifications, the first without 
market fixed effects (column 1) and the second with market fixed effects (column 2). 
The first row of Table 4.2. gives the average of the 114 estimated firm-specific first 
order effects (αj,), which is $712 in the model without market fixed effects, and $663 
in the model with market effects. There is substantial variation in the estimated firm 
effects; for example, the implied coefficient of variation in column 2 is 0.63.  
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Table 4.2.: Estimation of Cost Equation (4.7’) 
    
 (1)  (2) 
Mean(αj)   $712 $663 
Standard Deviation (αj) $245  $420 
Percent of αj > 0 100  98.8 
    
β  0.005 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.005) 
Market FE (σm)  no yes 
    
Observations 2357  2357 
R-squared 0.963  0.987 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is claims incurred by firm j operating in market m.  Estimation 
sample excludes firm-market pairs with fewer than 30 covered lives.  Robust standard 
errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses.  The αj are the coefficients on covered lives 
and β is the coefficient on the square of covered lives.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using Weiss Ratings data, 1998, and NAIC data, 1998. 
    
    
Consistent with our theoretical model, virtually all of the αj‘s are positive, and for 
each with a point estimate less than zero, the hypothesis that αj ≥  0 cannot be 
rejected. In both specifications, the second order effect β is not statistically 
different from zero, which implies constant returns to scale. Under constant returns 
to scale, our estimates of αj can be interpreted as marginal costs (and average 
costs); thus each new policyholder costs the average firm an additional $663 per 
year in claims. Not surprisingly, the model explains almost all the variation in 
claims within markets. Consistent with the Carlson-McAfee model, the firms in 
our data appear to be profit maximizers. 
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4.4.2.  Analysis of Firm Price-Setting Behavior 
Having established that that there is significant variation in marginal costs across 
firms, we next turn to the second key prediction of the Carlson-McAfee model: 
that variation in firm marginal costs, αj, leads to variation in prices, pj, as described 
in equation (4.9). We implement equation (4.9) as follows: 
 (4.9’)  () jspr jspr spr jspr
jspr spr
cc
pb XX
qq
κφ ϕ µ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=+ + + − + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 
The first difference between our implementation and the original equation (4.9) is 
that we use firm j’s average claims (c/q) as a proxy for αj. In the previous section, 
we obtained estimates of αj , but because these parameters were identified using 
within-firm variation over markets, they do not themselves vary across markets. 
Since firms price differently in different markets, the best measure of firm j’s 
marginal costs should also vary across markets. Moreover, we found in the 
previous section that average costs are approximately equal to marginal costs 
since 0 β ≈ . In equation (4.9), firm marginal costs enter twice; once in levels and 
again in deviations from the market mean. In (4.9’), we combine the two terms in 
levels, which from equation (4.9) implies that  1 κ φ = − , where κ>0 and φ>0. We 
do not impose this restriction, but test whether it holds.  
Equation (4.9) also lets other firm characteristics ( ) jspr spr XX −  affect prices in 
mean-deviated form—characteristics that may in fact differentiate seemingly 
homogeneous products. In (4.9’), we let  jspr X  be a vector containing the following 
variables: a set of indicator variables measuring firm j’s Weiss financial safety rating, 
(a measure of financial stability); indicators for whether firm j sells Medigap policies 
in fewer than 19 or more than 44 states, respectively (to capture name recognition and 
national presence); the total number of plan letters firm j  offers in the market (a 
measure of both market presence and the availability of close substitutes); an indicator  
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for whether the firm has a loss ratio greater than one for plan letter p (to control for 
loss leader pricing); indicators for whether plan letter p is sold by insurance agents or 
directly by the insurance company (a measure of firm advertising methods); and the 
number of months the policy has been on the market (a measure of market exposure).  
Equation (4.9’) includes a constant term, b, such that  () [ ]() S N N b γ + − = 1 1  in 
equation (4.9), where  ( )
2 1 2 SN N − = β γ . From our estimation of the cost equation, 
we found  0 β ≈ , which implies  0 γ ≈ , and thus that  [ ]S N N b 1 − ≈ ; in other words, 
our estimate of b should be slightly greater than the maximum search cost estimated 
over all markets nationwide. The last term,  jspr µ , is a stochastic error term, which is 
clustered by firm. 
Table 4.3. presents estimation results for equation (4.9’). In the first column, we 
show results for our base specification which includes just the cost terms and omits the 
product differentiation terms ( ) jspr spr XX − . We estimate κ=0.139 and  φ=0.484, both 
of which are statistically significant. Our estimate of φ implies that prices are higher in 
markets with higher average costs—for each dollar increase in market average costs, 
premiums rise by 48 cents. Holding constant market average costs, our estimate of κ 
suggests that firm premiums rise by about 14 cents for every one-dollar increase in 
firm costs that is above the market average. Although these results are generally 
consistent with the Carlson-McAfee model, our data reject the specific hypothesis that 
1 κφ =−. The constant in our model gives an estimate of b=$588, which as noted 
above should be slightly (i.e. by N/[N-1]) higher than our estimated maximum search 
cost. As we will show in Table 4.4., the maximum search cost estimated over all 
markets is quite a bit lower ($430), but because the maximum search cost varies by 
market, $588 is not so large as to be completely implausible.   
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Table 4.3.: Estimation of Price Equation (4.9’)  
    
  Price in Levels  Price Mean Deviated
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Firm Claims (κ)  0.139 0.138 0.139 0.137 
 
(0.053) (0.056) (0.008) (0.008) 
Market Average Claims (φ)  0.484 0.488    
 
(0.075) (0.074)    
Weiss Rating A    28.3  26.2 
    (73.2)  (13.1) 
Weiss Rating B    31.9  30.4 
    (64.2)  (10.3) 
Weiss Rating C    20.6  20.0 
    (64.1)  (12.1) 
No Weiss Rating    -56.2  -58.2 
    (71.7)  (12.7) 
Operates in Less Than 19 States    -31.8  -29.7 
    (37.6)   (9.5) 
Operates in More Than 44 States    78.5  78.5 
    (56.7)   (9.9) 
Number Plan Letters Offered    1.9  1.7 
    (7.9)  (1.7) 
Loss Ratio >1    -61.5  -61.9 
    (54.4)  (16.1) 
Agent Solicited Policy    21.2  16.3 
    (40.4)  (10.4) 
Direct Solicited Policy    -13.5  -17.4 
    (49.9)  (12.7) 
Months Policy on Market    0.738  0.745 
    (0.424)  (0.141) 
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Table 4.3.: (continued) 
      
  Price in Levels  Price Mean Deviated
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant (b) 588  586    
  (45) (41)    
      
Observations  2357 2327 2357 2327 
R-squared  0.392 0.414 0.106 0.207 
 
Notes:  
Specifications based on equation (4.9’) in the text. Dependent variable is the premium charged 
to 65-year-old female nonsmokers, entered in levels in columns (1) and (2) , and in deviations 
from the market mean premium in columns (3) and (4). All X variables entered as deviations 
from market mean. Sample includes firms that insure at least 30 individuals in any given 
market. Reference group for financial ratings is “Weiss Rating D or Worse”, and for states of 
operation, “Operates in 9 to 44 States”. Robust standard errors (clustered on a firm level) are in 
parentheses.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using Weiss Ratings data, 1998, and NAIC data, 1998. 
      
      
Column 2 adds the mean-deviated product differentiation terms to our base 
specification. Our estimates of κ, φ, and b are largely unchanged. None of the 
product differentiation terms are estimated precisely enough as to be statistically 
significant, and judging by the very small increase in the R-squared, they 
contribute little additional explanatory power. 
In column 3, we estimate a slightly different version of (4.9’) where we fully 
mean the dependent variable as well as the independent variables. Although it can be 
shown that this equation is theoretically equivalent to (4.9’), it confers an econometric 
advantage of controlling for market fixed effects. A disadvantage is that we cannot 
recover estimates of φ and b. Our estimate of κ is unchanged in this fully mean-
deviated specification. The point estimates on the product differentiation terms do not 
change much, but they are now much more precisely estimated. Firms with A, B, or C 
financial safety ratings charge $20-30 more than firms rated D or below, and unrated  
  116
firms charge about $58 less than these firms. Prices are also higher at firms with 
greater national presence and name recognition. For example, firms operating in more 
than 44 states charge $79 more than firms operating in 19 to 44 states and about $110 
more than firms operating in fewer than 19 states. The number of plan letters sold by a 
given firm does not affect prices. Firms operating in a given market with losses charge 
about $61 less. Although this does not confirm the existence of loss leader pricing, it is 
consistent with its use by some firms. Solicitation method, whether by agents or direct 
from the firm, is largely unrelated to price, and policies that have been on the market 
longer are more expensive. Overall, the product differentiation terms contribute as 
much explanatory power in the fully mean deviated model as do marginal costs 
themselves, underscoring the importance of controlling for product differentiation 
when estimating search costs based on observed price variation.  
In sum, our analyses of the cost and price-setting equations establish that the firms 
in the Medigap market largely behave as predicted by our augmented Carlson-McAfee 
model. Insurance firms are profit maximizers with varying marginal costs, which 
contribute to variation in prices. We next turn to the question of why price variation is 
sustained in the market. 
 
4.4.3.  Analysis of Demand 
The starting point for our demand analysis is equation (4.4). Dividing both sides of 
(4.4) by  spr spr N Q , where  spr Q is total covered lives in market spr, and adding a 
stochastic error term  jspr µ , yields our empirical specification of the demand 
equation:  
 (4.4’)  () ()
1
1
spr
spr
jspr
jspr spr jspr spr jspr Q
N
q
pp XX
SS
λ
µ =− − + − +   
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Once again, Xjspr is a vector containing our measures of product differentiation. We 
estimate (4.4’) using a tobit procedure, since approximately 24 percent of firms in 
our data report zero covered lives. We exclude markets in which only one firm 
operates (since there is no price variation), and once again we allow  jspr µ  to be 
clustered by firm. Because all regressors are mean-deviated, identification comes 
from variation within markets. Note that because the mean of our dependent 
variable is 1, this specification is equivalent to a fully mean-deviated model. 
Table 4.4. presents our estimation results. The first column shows the estimated 
coefficients and column 2 gives the implied estimates of the maximum search cost S 
(row 1) and of the elements in the λ vector (all other rows). In the first row of column 
1, we see that firms with above-average prices experience lower demand. Firms with a 
financial safety rating of A experience notably higher demand, but, surprisingly, so do 
firms unrated firms. Demand is greatest at firms operating with the most national 
presence, i.e., those operating in more than 44 states. Firms selling plans with a loss 
ratio>1 experience notably higher demand, even controlling for price. Demand is 
slightly statistically higher with agent solicitation, whereas direct solicitation and the 
number of months a policy has been on the market does not appreciably affect 
demand.  
Column 2 in Table 4.4. shows our implied estimates of the parameters S and λ. 
Standard errors are obtained using a bootstrap procedure on the model in column1.
38 
The first row depicts the estimated maximum search cost, S, which is the inverse of 
the coefficient in column 1 multiplied by -1. The implied maximum search cost in the 
Medigap market is substantial, estimated to be $430. Under the assumption that search 
                                                 
38 The standard error for the first row is obtained by the delta method. For the bootstrap, we apply 
Andrews and Buchinsky’s (2000) method to find an optimal number of repetitions. We require the 
standard errors to be at most 5 percent different from a bootstrap with infinite replications with a 
probability of at least 99 percent. This requires 1943 repetitions.   
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Table 4.4.: Estimation of Demand Equation (4.4’) 
       
  (1)  (2)
1) 
    
Price -0.0023*** 430***
 
(0.0004)
 
(70)
 
Weiss Rating A  2.1484*** 925***
 
(0.5150)
 
(277) 
Weiss Rating B  0.3632   156  
 
(0.3391)
 
(171) 
Weiss Rating C  0.8215**  353* 
 
(0.3482)
 
(184) 
No Weiss Rating  1.3038**  561* 
 
(0.5525)
 
(320) 
Operates in Less Than 19 States   -1.7223*** -741** 
 
(0.6390)
 
(346) 
Operates in At Least 19 But Less Than 
45 States  -2.5284*** -1088***
 
(0.5403)
 
(340) 
Number Plan Letters Offered  -0.1207*  -52  
 
(0.0629)
 
(33) 
Loss Ratio >1  1.9675*** 847***
 
(0.4258)
 
(255) 
Agent Solicited Policy  0.9872*  425  
  (0.5066)
 
(285) 
Direct Solicited Policy  0.6535   281 
  (0.5867)
 
(302) 
Months Policy on Market  0.0092   3.95 
 
(0.0056)
  (2.66) 
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Table 4.4.: (continued) 
     
  (1)  (2)
1) 
     
     
χ
2 (added)  78.64     
P(added)=0 0.00     
LL Ratio  0.930     
     
Notes: 
Econometric model is a tobit model. All regressors enter ed in mean-deviated form. The χ
2 
statistic refers to the addition of all variables other than price. “LL Ratio” is the ratio of the 
log-likelihood of this tobit model and a model without any independent variables. Reference 
group for financial rating is “Weiss Rating D or Worse”, and for states of operation is 
“Operates in More Than 44 States.” 
1) Column (2) shows the implied estimates of S (row 1) and λ (all other rows) in equation 
(4.4’).  The entry in row 1 is obtained by inverting the coefficient in column (1) and 
multiplying by –1.  In all other rows, the entry is obtained by dividing the corresponding 
coefficient in column (1) by the coefficient on price in column (1) (-1/S). The standard errors 
in column 2 (except for the first value) are obtained using bootstrapping with 1943 replications 
on the full sample. The standard error for the first value is obtained by the delta method. 
Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses. 
*, **, ***: significant on a 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Weiss Ratings data, 1998, and NAIC data, 1998. 
     
     
costs are uniformly distributed, dividing by 2 yields an average search cost of 
$215. The remaining quantities in column 2 represent the λ-coefficients from the 
original utility specification in equation (1). They may be interpreted as the 
marginal utility (in monetary terms) of other firm characteristics. For example, the 
estimates imply that a financial safety rating of A is worth $925 to consumers, and 
a loss ratio >1 is worth $847. It is not clear what this latter value actually 
measures, since it is unlikely that many consumers undertake to compute loss 
ratios for insurance firms.   
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Table 4.5.: Implied Maximum Search Cost S by Plan and Rating Method 
          
 
Estimated 
Coefficient on 
Price 
Implied 
Maximum 
Search Cost  N LL  Ratio
       
Plan A  -0.0016   636   1085 0.900
  
(0.0011)  (436)    
Plan B  -0.0023**  430**  723 0.882
 
(0.0010)  (189)    
Plan C  -0.0029*** 341*** 1066 0.949
 
(0.0008)  (88)    
Plan D  -0.0037*** 271*** 432 0.820
 
(0.0013)  (92)    
Plan E  -0.0034**  295**  201 0.810
 
(0.0015)  (133)    
Plan F  -0.0024*** 409*** 1118 0.946
 
(0.0006)  (99)    
Plan G  -0.0053*** 187*** 509 0.812
 
(0.0009)  (32)    
Plan H  -0.0015**  680**  112 0.819
 
(0.0006)  (297)    
Plan I  -0.0017*** 583*** 303 0.848
 
(0.0003)  (115)    
Plans J  -0.0008   1210   175 0.831
 
(0.0005)  (773)    
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Table 4.5.: (continued) 
            
 
Estimated 
Coefficient on 
Price 
Implied 
Maximum 
Search Cost  N LL  Ratio
            
Attained Age  -0.0028*** 360*** 3468 0.932
 
(0.0005)  (69)    
Issued Age  -0.0020*** 502*** 1852 0.899
 
(0.0005)  (113)    
Community Rating  -0.0010*** 972*** 404 0.881
 
(0.0004)  (335)    
All -0.0023*** 430*** 5724 0.922
 
(0.0004)  (70)    
Notes: 
Each row gives the price coefficient from a tobit model estimated on the indicated subsample, 
using the same specification as in Table 7.  The implied maximum search cost figures are 
obtained by multiplying the inverse price coefficient by (-1), following equation (4’).  The 
standard errors follow by the delta method. “LL Ratio” is the ratio of the log-likelihood of this 
tobit model and a model without any independent variables. Regressions include Weiss Rating 
indicators, whether the firm operates in less then nine or more than 44 markets, respectively, 
whether the plan is agent solicited, and which plans this firm offers in this state other than the 
one in the current state-plan-rating cell. 
Robust standard errors (on a firm level) are in parentheses. 
*, **, ***: significant on a 10, 5, and 1percent level, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Weiss Ratings data, 1998, and NAIC data, 1998. 
            
          
Using the same specification in Table 4.4., we next estimate equation (4.4’) 
separately by plan and by rating method to see whether and how search costs might 
vary across different parts of the market. Shown in Table 4.5. are the estimated 
price coefficients (column 1) and the implied maximum search costs (column 2). 
The (statistically significant) estimates range from $187 (Plan G) to $680 (plan H). 
There are significant differences in search costs across the plans, although they 
occur without any discernable pattern. There are also differences in maximum  
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search costs across the three rating methods with the highest estimated maximum 
search costs arising in the markets for Community Rated policies. As noted before, 
over all markets we obtain a maximum search cost of $430, and an average search 
cost of $215. 
 
4.4.4. Discussion 
Compared to studies of other markets, our estimated search costs are high. For 
example, using a similarly specified model, Dahlby and West (1986) found average 
search costs to be between $28 to $125 in the market for auto insurance. Horceçsu 
and Syverson (2004) found that search costs ranged between $5 and $30 for every 
$10,000 of assets invested in the mutual fund market. It is less straightforward to 
compare our results to the results in Hortaçsu and Syverson since they assume 
firms are found by consumers with unequal probabilities, whereas we assume that 
each firm is found with the same probability, 1/N. On the other hand, Hortaçsu and 
Syverson do not have product differentiation variables in their data, whereas we 
are able to take into account terms like the market presence and the financial rating 
of the firm. These will at least to some extent account for differences in the 
probabilities of finding a given firm, and also appear to have a significant 
influence on demand. 
To further judge the plausibility of our estimates, we use our model to quantify 
the fraction of consumers in the market who buy at the highest price and the fraction 
who search until they find the lowest price. Using the estimated parameters of 
equation (4.4’), we can estimate the set of expected utility gains from searching in 
each market (the wj’s in equation (4.2)), and then quantify the fractions of insured 
individuals that are associated with each expected utility gain. In other words, we can  
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specify the Wj’s in Figure 4.1 for each of the 830 markets and consider their 
distribution (taking into account the covariates specified above). 
To understand our presentation of these results in Figure 4.2, it is useful to first 
consider what we would expect in the extreme. First, imagine a setting in which 99 
percent of the individuals in each market search until they find the plan yielding 
the highest utility. Thus the fraction buying from Firm 1 (W1) is 0.99 in each 
market, and a cumulative density of W1 will be zero until the 99
th percentile and 
then one afterwards. In the opposite scenario, where 99 percent face search costs 
such that they buy from the firm yielding the lowest utility (firm N), the 
cumulative density of WN  will take the same shape. Figure 4.2 graphs the 
cumulative densities for W1 and WN, as calculated over all markets we observe. The 
y-axis gives the cumulative density and the x-axis is the fraction in the market 
buying the plan with the highest utility (W1) or lowest utility (WN), as the case may 
be. Comparing the extremes discussed before to the lines plotted in Figure 4.2 
gives some insight about the information deficits and the extent of search in the 
Medigap market. The cumulative distribution function for WN  indicates that in two 
thirds of all markets, the fraction of people potentially buying the worst plan is 11 
percent or less. However, as the distribution for W1 shows, in two thirds of all 
markets only 11 percent or less search until they find the plan yielding the highest 
utility. So while some information flow seems to be present and most individuals 
search somewhat, very few search until they find the lowest price in the market; 
large parts of the Medigap population face search costs that are high enough to 
prevent them from searching until they find the plan with the lowest price.  
That search costs would be higher in the Medigap market than in other markets is 
not implausible, especially given the relatively advanced age of the consumer 
population buying Medigap plans, and the potential for age-related cognitive decline 
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative Distribution of W1 and WN  over all Markets 
 
among many of them. Even in the absence of cognitive decline, the Medigap 
market is quite complicated, and its relationship with the equally complicated 
Medicare program could be challenging for some to understand. It could also be 
difficult to understand one’s specific needs for supplemental insurance coverage 
without having had much practical experience with Medicare’s coinsurance 
requirements. Furthermore, no individual has any familiarity with the Medigap 
market prior to turning age 65, and neither do one’s adult children, should their 
assistance be sought. Individuals have a relatively short window of time during 
which to search for and select a Medigap policy, and the one-shot nature of the 
market means that learning does not occur with successive purchases, and mistakes  
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are not easily reversible. Our results seem plausible given the complex nature of 
the market and its elderly consumer population. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we investigate why substantial price variation is sustained in the 
market for supplemental health insurance for the elderly. We show that a model 
allowing for information deficiencies on the consumer side cannot be rejected. 
This can be taken as evidence that a key assumption of a competitive market is 
violated in this market: consumers are not fully informed when entering the 
market. 
Using price data from Weiss Ratings and demand data from the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, we analyze the Medigap market in 1998. As 
a framework for understanding the price variation, we consider a theoretical model by 
Carlson and McAfee (1983), which we augment to account for product differentiation. 
We conclude that firms in this market behave according to the assumptions of the C-M 
model. They are profit maximizers who have different cost structures; their different 
cost structures contribute to price differences that are sustained by the presence of 
significant consumer search costs. We estimate average search costs to be about $215. 
Our estimates imply that while relatively few individuals buy the highest priced 
policy, equally few find the policy with the lowest price (i.e. yielding the highest 
utility).  
Even in 2006, it can be a relatively time-intensive activity to collect price 
information from different Medigap insurers. Certainly more information is available 
over the internet than ever before, however, insurers do not usually post their rates 
online, and while some state insurance websites list Medigap insurers, they do not also 
list prices. Finding the lowest price requires calls to many different insurers.  
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Moreover, it is uncertain whether the elderly experience large information gains from 
technology improvements like the internet.  
Our results suggest that consumer welfare could be substantially improved if 
individuals had complete knowledge of the price distribution in the market. An 
important step in this direction is the “Weiss Ratings Shopper’s Guide to Medicare 
Supplemental Insurance,” which is a customized report listing prices for all Medigap 
policies offered in a consumer’s zip code (given age and gender) by rating method and 
Weiss’ financial safety rating. The report is available for $49 and can be ordered by 
telephone or via the internet.
39  Compared to the average cost of search in the market, 
the Weiss report is a bargain. Increasing consumer’s knowledge of this resource or 
developing a similar free resource would go a long way toward enhancing information 
in the market and improving welfare. As policymakers move toward granting the 
elderly greater choice in insurer selection and benefit provision in other areas of the 
Medicare program, such as the new Medicare prescription drug benefit, the issue of 
information availability and search costs become very salient in assessing consumer 
welfare under the new policies. 
 
                                                 
39 Weiss Ratings Inc distributes information regarding the Medigap market on the Internet. Specifically, 
based on their age and the state they live in, consumers can obtain premiums, rating method, and Weiss’ 
financial rating for each company and all plans offered in the state and age group. As of March, 2006, 
this information costs $49, see http://www.weissratings.com/Products/sen_rep.asp.  
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4.6.  Appendix 4.1.: Formulas 
4.6.1.  Demand Equation  
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Then the following terms within this equation are obtained: 
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To obtain equation (4), we use (10) and (11) and evaluate for each qj, starting with 
qN:  
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For qN-1 we get: 
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Repeating this process for each firm j leads to the demand equation (4). 
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4.6.2. Price  Equation 
The price equation (9) follows from maximizing equation (8)  
(8)  ( ) j j j j j q c q p − = Π   
with respect to price, after substituting in the cost equation, (7):  
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Note that from equation (4) and equation (1),  
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Then we obtain the following derivative with respect to (the firm’s own) price: 
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This can be simplified into the following expression: 
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Since the solution is algebraically complicated, we now show with an example of 
three firms, that the solution presented in equation (9) is correct. For N=3, there 
are three equations (16) in three unknowns, which can be solved by substituting in. 
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Substituting (163) into (162) and solving for p2 yields a function in terms of p1: 
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Plugging (162’) back into (163) yields a similar formula for p3: 
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Then, using (162’) and (163’) in (161), we obtain the formula for p1:  
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Note that () 0 3 3 2 1 = − − − X X X X ; then after some rearranging of the a1 terms, 
(161’) simplifies to:  
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which is exactly what was proposed in equation (9) if N=3. 
 
4.6.3. Profit  Maximization 
For firms to be profit maximizing, the second derivative has to be negative:  
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Note that (17) is only less than zero if  
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Hence β is bounded from below, where β≥0 will lead to the profit maximizing 
condition in any case.  
 
4.7.  Appendix 4.2.: Data  
As mentioned in the first chapter (section 1.5.1), the Weiss data are aggregated to a 
state level dataset by averaging over a firm’s offers in all zip-codes in any state the 
firm operates in. The Medigap policies are restricted to standard plans (i.e. no 
select or smoker plans) offered to 65 year-old women.  
Our second dataset, from NAIC, contains data for all Medigap policies issued by 
insurance companies in a given state during the years 1996-1998. We only keep 
observations on individual standard Medigap policies offered after OBRA-90 within 
the continental United States (except Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin which 
have different standardization schemes). Some plan letters are offered more than once 
by the same firm in the same state. These are likely to be plans that differ across 
counties, as observed in the Weiss data. Since we have no means of identifying these  
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local differences, we combine these plans (about 22 percent), summing up covered 
lives, premiums and claims, such that each firm only offers one policy in each state-
plan letter cell. To the extent we are combining policies with different rating methods, 
these cases will not be present in our merged sample since we exclude the two percent 
of policies in the Weiss data where firms use more than one rating method in a given 
market.  
Both the Weiss data and the NAIC data have the company name of the firms 
offering a Medigap policy. After some minor adjustments, we can merge the two 
datasets based on the company name, the US state of operation and the plan letter. 
(Note that the NAIC data do not have any information on the age of the people 
covered under the policy.) To analyze how well the two datasets merge, we focus on 
the number of covered lives represented by firms in the NAIC data that we 
successfully merge to firms in the Weiss data. For example, the NAIC data contain 
firms representing 1,814,515 covered lives between 1996 and 1998. Firms 
representing 151,053 of these covered lives are not found in the Weiss data; thus our 
merged sample captures 91.6 percent of the Medigap market nationwide. Column 1 of 
Appendix Table A4.1. shows the total number of covered lives accounted for by firms 
in the NAIC data, by plan letter, and Column 2 shows the number of covered lives not 
matched to the Weiss data. Appendix Table A4.2. shows the fraction of NAIC covered 
lives not matched by state and plan letter. In most state-plan letter combinations, the 
fraction not matched is very low; however in order to guarantee that we observe 
“most” of any given market, we drop those state-plan letter cells where the fraction not 
matched exceeds 50 percent. Overall, we drop cells representing just 5,618 covered 
lives, or 0.3 percent of total covered lives (App. Table 2, col. 3). Column 4 of 
Appendix Table A4.1. reports the fraction of total covered lives either not matched or 
omitted to be just 8.6 percent.  
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4.8. Appendix  Tables 
 
Appendix Table 4.1.: Statistics from Merging Weiss and NAIC Data 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Plan Letter 
 
Total NAIC 
Covered Lives
 
Covered Lives
Not Matched 
to Weiss Data
 
Covered Lives 
Dropped
1) 
 
Fraction 
Dropped or 
Not Matched
2)
 
  A  88151 7780  467  0.09 
  B  129499 6786  0  0.05 
  C  468767 40683  82  0.09 
  D  143838 10208  826  0.08 
  E  29298 104  0  0.00 
  F  762457 64531  0  0.08 
  G  54672 3437  46  0.06 
  H  31044 15664  3851  0.63 
  I  44274 1258  323  0.04 
  J  62515 602  23  0.01 
Total  1814515 151053  5618  0.09 
 
Notes: 
A “matched” record refers to a successful merge of a firm-state-plan letter combination in the 
Weiss and NAIC data.  
1) Number of covered lives in state-plan letter cells that were dropped because fewer than 50 
percent of covered lives were matched. See Appendix Table 4.2. for match rates by state and 
plan letter. 
2) (4) = [(2) + (3)] / (1) 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Weiss Ratings data, 1998, and NAIC data, 1998.  
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Appendix Table 4.2.: Fraction of NAIC Covered Lives Not Matched  
in Weiss Data by State and Plan 
             
      PLAN     
STATE  A B C D E F G H I  J 
            
  AK  0.02 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00           
  AL  0.33 0.27 0.34 0.13 0.00 0.35 0.43 0.00 0.00           
  AR  0.03 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 
  AZ  0.19 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 
  CA  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.14           
  CO  0.05 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.20 0.08 0.02 0.06 
  CT  0.01 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.94 0.00 
  DC  0.04 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00           
  DE  0.01  0.00  0.57  0.18  0.00  0.03               0.00       
  FL  0.04 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.00 
  GA  0.07 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00           
  HI  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00        0.00  1.00                     
  IA  0.18 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
  ID  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.40  0.00  0.00         0.00       
  IL  0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 
  IN  0.04 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.19 0.56 
  KS  0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.00 
  KY  0.15 0.18 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.90 0.00 0.00 
  LA  0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.00           
  MD  0.02 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.04              0.00 0.00 
  ME  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
  MI  0.11  0.18  0.20  0.05  0.00  0.32  0.00         0.01       
  MO  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.48 0.57 0.00 
  MS  0.14 0.31 0.21 0.83 0.01 0.44 0.14 0.00 0.22 0.01 
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Appendix Table 4.2.: (continued) 
            
       PLAN      
STATE  A B C D E F G H I  J 
            
  MT  0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 
  NC  0.09 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 
  ND  0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.13 
  NE  0.12 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.07 
  NH  0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.50 0.00           
  NJ  0.10 0.47 0.12 0.29 0.33 0.05 0.78 1.00 0.04 1.00 
  NM  0.19  0.11  0.07  0.00        0.08  0.04         0.00  0.00 
  NV  0.08 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 
  NY  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03        0.01  0.00  0.07  0.65       
  OH  0.09 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.43 0.40 
  OK  0.19 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00           
  OR  0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00           
  PA  0.00 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.78 1.00 0.00 
  RI  0.06  0.03  0.01  0.16        0.07  0.05  0.05  0.00       
  SC  0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01           
  SD  0.08 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  TN  0.39 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.02           
  TX  0.47 0.28 0.25 0.38 0.00 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.18 
  UT  0.78  0.00  0.02  0.00        0.03  0.01  0.00  0.01       
  VA  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  VT  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00            0.63 1.00 0.00 
  WA  0.03 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.01 
  WV  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 
  WY  0.07 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
 
Notes:  
Cell entries give the fraction of total NAIC covered lives not matched to the Weiss data. State-
plan letter cells with a fraction larger than 0.50 are dropped from the analysis.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using Weiss Ratings data, 1998, and NAIC data, 1998. 
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